Why "good" firms do bad things: The effects of high aspirations, high expectations, and prominence on the incidence of corporate illegality

Academy of Management Journal

Volumn 53, Issue 4, 2010, Pages 701-722

  Mishina, Yuri ^a   Dykes, Bernadine ^b   Block, Emily ^c   Pollock, Timothy ^d  

^a MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF DELAWARE   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAME   (United States)

^d PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 77955681683     PISSN: 00014273     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.5465/amj.2010.52814578     Document Type: Article

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