Organizational design, technology and the boundaries of the firm

Economica

Volumn 77, Issue 307, 2010, Pages 544-564

  Halonen Akatwijuka, Maija ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BRISTOL   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

FIRM OWNERSHIP; FIRM SIZE; PRODUCTIVITY; TECHNOLOGY;

EID: 77955253145     PISSN: 00130427     EISSN: 14680335     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0335.2008.00767.x     Document Type: Article

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