Asset specificity and vertical integration

Scandinavian Journal of Economics

Volumn 109, Issue 3, 2007, Pages 551-572

  Kvaløy, Ola ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF STAVANGER   (Norway)

Author keywords

Hold up,asset specificity; Relational contracts; Verticalintegration

Indexed keywords

ECONOMIC THEORY; VERTICAL INTEGRATION;

EID: 36448963810     PISSN: 03470520     EISSN: 14679442     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9442.2007.00507.x     Document Type: Article

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