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Volumn 22, Issue 1, 2006, Pages 234-257

Specificity revisited: The role of cross-investments

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EID: 32644434483     PISSN: 87566222     EISSN: 14657341     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/jleo/ewj006     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (16)

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