Public goods, social norms, and naïve beliefs

Journal of Public Economic Theory

Volumn 12, Issue 2, 2010, Pages 199-223

  Cartwright, Edward ^a   Patel, Amrish ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF KENT   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSITY OF GOTHENBURG   (Sweden)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 77955032202     PISSN: 10973923     EISSN: 14679779     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9779.2009.01457.x     Document Type: Article

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