Conformity and out of equilibrium beliefs

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Volumn 70, Issue 1-2, 2009, Pages 164-185

  Cartwright, Edward ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF KENT   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Conformity; Out of equilibrium beliefs; Signalling; Social norms

Indexed keywords

EID: 64249147191     PISSN: 01672681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2008.11.003     Document Type: Article

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