Revisiting games of incomplete information with analogy-based expectations

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 62, Issue 2, 2008, Pages 533-557

  Jehiel, Philippe ^a,b   Koessler, Frédéric ^a  

^a PARIS SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (France)

^b UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Analogy expectation; Bayesian games; Betting; Bounded rationality; Coordination; Incomplete information; Strategic information transmission

Indexed keywords

EID: 39149083111     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: 10902473     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2007.06.006     Document Type: Article

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