On the generic strategic stability of Nash equilibria if voting is costly

Economic Theory

Volumn 25, Issue 2, 2005, Pages 477-486

  De Sinopoli, Francesco ^a   Iannantuoni, Giovanna ^a  

^a UNIVERSIDAD CARLOS III DE MADRID   (Spain)

Author keywords

Plurality rule; Regular equilibria; Stable sets

Indexed keywords

EID: 21244486333     PISSN: 09382259     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00199-003-0441-9     Document Type: Article

References (13)

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