Algorithmic mechanisms for internet-based master-worker computing with untrusted and selfish workers

Proceedings of the 2010 IEEE International Symposium on Parallel and Distributed Processing, IPDPS 2010

Volumn , Issue , 2010, Pages

  Anta, Antonio Fernández ^a   Georgiou, Chryssis ^b   Mosteiro, Miguel A ^a  

^a UNIVERSIDAD REY JUAN CARLOS   (Spain)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CYPRUS   (Cyprus)

Author keywords

Algorithmic mechanism; Altruistic and malicious processors; Internet based computing; Rational; Task execution; Volunteering computing

Indexed keywords

COMPUTATIONAL TASK; DISTRIBUTED COMPUTING; INTERNET BASED; INTERNET BASED COMPUTING; MASTER PROCESSOR; MASTER-WORKER APPLICATIONS; STOCHASTIC DISTRIBUTION; SUPER COMPUTING; TASK EXECUTIONS;

ALGORITHMS; DISTRIBUTED PARAMETER NETWORKS; GAME THEORY; MACHINE DESIGN;

INTERNET;

EID: 77954012718     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1109/IPDPS.2010.5470409     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (39)

1. I. Abraham, D. Dolev, R. Goden, and J.Y. Halpern. Distributed computing meets game theory: Robust mechanisms for rational secret sharing and multiparty computation. In proc. of PODC 2006, pp. 53-62, 2006.
2. A. S. Aiyer, L. Alvisi, A. Clement, M. Dahlin, J. Martin, and C. Porth. BAR fault tolerance for cooperative services. In proc. of SOSP 2005, pp. 45-58, 2005.
3. D. Anderson. BOINC: A system for public-resource computing and storage. In proc. of GRID 2004, pp. 4-10, 2004.
4. M. Babaioff, M. Feldman, and N. Nisan. Mixed Strategies in Combinatorial Agency. In proc. of WINE 2006, pp. 353-364, 2006.
5. J. R. Douceur. The Sybil attack. In proc. of IPTPS 2002, pp. 251-260, 2002.
6. S. Chien and A. Sinclair. Convergence to approximate Nash equilibria in congestion games. In proc. of SODA 2007, pp. 169-178, 2007.
7. G. Christodoulou and E. Koutsoupias. Mechanism design for scheduling. Bulletin of the EATCS, 97:39-59, 2009.
8. "Enabling Grids for E-sciencE", http://www.eu-egee.org.
9. K. Eliaz. Fault tolerant implementation. Review of Economic Studies, 69:589-610, 2002.
10. W. Feller. An Introduction to Probability Theory and Its Applications. John Wiley & Sons, 3rd edition, 1968.
11. A. Fernandez, Ch. Georgiou, L. Lopez, and A. Santos. Reliably executing tasks in the presence of untrusted processors. In proc. of SRDS 2006, pp. 39-50, 2006.
12. A. Fernandez Anta, Ch. Georgiou, and M. A. Mosteiro. Designing mechanisms for reliable Internet-based computing. In proc. of NCA 2008, pp. 315-324, 2008.
13. I.T. Foster and A. Iamnitchi. On death, taxes, and the convergence of P2P and grid computing. In proc. of IPTPS 2003, pp. 118-128, 2003.
14. D. Fotakis. Memoryless facility location in one pass. In proc. of STACS 2006, pp. 608-620, 2006.
15. M. Gairing. Malicious Bayesian congestion games. In proc. of WAOA 2008, pp. 119-132, 2008.
16. P. Golle and I. Mironov. Uncheatable distributed computations. In proc. of CT-RSA 2001, pp. 425-440, 2001.
17. M. Halldorsson, J.Y. Halpern, L. Li, and V. Mirrokni. On spectrum sharing games. In proc. of PODC 2004, pp. 107-114, 2004.
18. J.Y. Halpern. Computer science and game theory: A brief survey. Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2007.
19. J.Y. Halpern and V. Teague. Rational secret sharing and multiparty computation. In proc. of STOC 2004, pp. 623-632.
20. J. C. Harsanyi. Games with incomplete information played by Bayesian players, I, II, III. Management Science, 14:159182, 320332, 468502, 1967.
21. W. G. Horner. A new method of solving numerical equations of all orders by continuous approximation. Philos. Trans. Roy. Soc. London 109:308-335, 1819.
22. Konwar, S. Rajasekaran, and A.A. Shvartsman. Robust network supercomputing with malicious processes. In proc. of DISC 2006, pp. 474-488, 2006.
23. E. Korpela, D. Werthimer, D. Anderson, J. Cobb, and M. Lebofsky. SETI@home: Massively distributed computing for SETI. Computing in Science and Engineering, 3(1):78-83, 2001.
24. E. Koutsoupias and Ch. Papadimitriou. Worst-case equilibria. In proc. of STACS 1999, pp. 404-413, 1999.
25. H. C. Li, A. Clement, M. Marchetti, M. Kapritsos, L. Robison, L. Alvisi, and M. Dahlin. FlightPath: Obedience vs. choice in cooperative services. In proc. of OSDI 2008, pp. 355-368, 2008.
26. H. C. Li, A. Clement, E. L. Wong, J. Napper, I. Roy, L. Alvisi, and M. Dahlin. BAR gossip. In proc. of OSDI 2006, pp. 191-204, 2006.
27. G. Mailath and L. Samuelson. Repeated Games and Reputations: Long-run Relationships, Oxford University Press, 2006.
28. M. Mavronicolas and P. Spirakis. The price of selfish routing. Algorithmica, 48(1):91-126, 2007.
29. M. Mitzenmacher and E. Upfal. Probability and Computing: Randomized Algorithms and Probabilistic Analysis. Cambridge University Press, 2005.
30. T. Moscibroda, S. Schmid, and R. Wattenhofer. When selfish meets evil: byzantine players in a virus inoculation game. In proc. of PODC 2006, pp. 35-44, 2006.
31. J.F. Nash. Equilibrium points in n-person games. National Academy of Sciences, 36(1):48-49, 1950.
32. N. Nisan and A. Ronen. Algorithmic mechanism design. Games and Economic Behavior, 35:166-196, 2001.
33. N. Nisan, T. Roughgarden, E. Tardos, and V.V. Vazirani, editors. Algorithmic Game Theory. Cambridge University Press, 2007.
34. M. J. Osborne. An Introduction to Game Theory. Oxford University Press, 2003.
35. T. Roughgarden and E. Tardos. How bad is selfish routing? Journal of ACM, 49(2):236-259, 2002.
36. R. W. Rosenthal. A class of games possessing pure-strategy Nash equilibria. International Journal of Game Theory, 2:65-67, 1973.
37. J. Shneidman and D.C. Parkes. Rationality and self-interest in P2P networks. In proc. of IPTPS 2003, pp. 139-148, 2003.
38. Tables of Probability Functions, Volume = 2, National Bureau of Standards, 1942.
39. M. Yurkewych, B.N. Levine, and A.L. Rosenberg. On the cost-ineffectiveness of redundancy in commercial P2P computing. In proc. of CCS 2005, pp. 280-288, 2005.