Mixed strategies in combinatorial agency: (Extended abstract)

Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)

Volumn 4286 LNCS, Issue , 2006, Pages 353-364

  Babaioff, Moshe ^a   Feldman, Michal ^b   Nisan, Noam ^b  

^a UC Berkeley School of Information   (United States)

^b HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM   (Israel)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COMBINATORIAL STRUCTURES; EXTENDED ABSTRACTS; MIXED STRATEGY; PURE NASH EQUILIBRIUM; SUFFICIENT CONDITIONS;

WINE;

INTERNET;

EID: 77049096072     PISSN: 03029743     EISSN: 16113349     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1007/11944874_32     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (10)

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