Government Revenues and Economic Growth in Weakly Institutionalised States

Economic Journal

Volumn 120, Issue 545, 2010, Pages 631-650

  Oechslin, Manuel ^a  

^a TILBURG UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ECONOMIC GROWTH; EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS; INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK; MODELING; PUBLIC GOODS; TECHNOLOGY ADOPTION;

EID: 77953899794     PISSN: 00130133     EISSN: 14680297     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2009.02349.x     Document Type: Article

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