Individual or team decision-making-Causes and consequences of self-selection

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 56, Issue 2, 2006, Pages 259-270

  Kocher, Martin ^a   Strauß, Sabine ^a   Sutter, Matthias ^b,c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF INNSBRUCK   (Austria)

^b MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE FOR THE SCIENCE OF HUMAN HISTORY   (Germany)

^c UNIVERSITY OF COLOGNE   (Germany)

Author keywords

Beauty contest game; Endogenous choice; Experiment; Individual decision making; Team decision making

Indexed keywords

EID: 33744522820     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: 10902473     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2005.08.009     Document Type: Article

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