Leadership games with convex strategy sets

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 69, Issue 2, 2010, Pages 446-457

  von Stengel, Bernhard ^a   Zamir, Shmuel ^b  

^a LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (United Kingdom)

^b HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM   (Israel)

Author keywords

Commitment; Correlated equilibrium; First mover advantage; Follower; Leader; Stackelberg game

Indexed keywords

EID: 77953540910     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: 10902473     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2009.11.008     Document Type: Article

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