Reinterpreting mixed strategy equilibria: A unification of the classical and Bayesian views

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 48, Issue 2, 2004, Pages 355-384

  Reny, Philip J ^a   Robson, Arthur J ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO   (United States)

^b SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 3242802230     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2003.09.009     Document Type: Article

References (17)

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