Stability and success of regional fisheries management organizations

Environmental and Resource Economics

Volumn 46, Issue 3, 2010, Pages 377-402

  Pintassilgo, Pedro ^a   Finus, Michael ^b   Lindroos, Marko ^c   Munro, Gordon ^d,e  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ALGARVE   (Portugal)

^b UNIVERSITY OF EXETER BUSINESS SCHOOL   (United Kingdom)

^c UNIVERSITY OF HELSINKI   (Finland)

^d UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA   (Canada)

^e UNIVERSITY OF PORTSMOUTH   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Bioeconomic model; Coalition formation model; Free riding; Regional fisheries management organizations; Straddling fish stock; Unregulated fishing

Indexed keywords

FISH; SOCIETIES AND INSTITUTIONS;

BIO-ECONOMIC MODEL; COALITION FORMATIONS; FISH STOCK; FISHERIES MANAGEMENT; FREE RIDING;

FISHERIES;

COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS; FISHERY MODELING; FISHING; INCENTIVE; INTERNATIONAL LAW; REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT; STOCK ASSESSMENT;

EID: 77953478664     PISSN: 09246460     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10640-010-9346-9     Document Type: Article

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