A long polycentric journey

Annual Review of Political Science

Volumn 13, Issue , 2010, Pages 1-23

  Ostrom, Elinor ^a  

^a INDIANA UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Collective action; Common pool resources; Institutional analysis; Public goods

Indexed keywords

EID: 77952912246     PISSN: 10942939     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1146/annurev.polisci.090808.123259     Document Type: Article

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