Bribing versus gift-giving - An experiment

Journal of Economic Psychology

Volumn 31, Issue 3, 2010, Pages 347-357

  Lambsdorff, Johann Graf ^a   Frank, Björn ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PASSAU   (Germany)

^b UNIVERSITY OF KASSEL   (Germany)

Author keywords

Corruption; Crime prevention; Experiment; Framing; Opportunism

Indexed keywords

EID: 77952743583     PISSN: 01674870     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2010.01.004     Document Type: Article

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