The use and abuse of trust: Social capital and its deployment by early modern guilds

Jahrbuch fur Wirtschaftsgeschichte

Volumn , Issue 1, 2005, Pages 15-52

  Ogilvie, Sheilagh ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 30744465452     PISSN: 00752800     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1524/jbwg.2005.46.1.15     Document Type: Article

References (172)

1. J.S. Coleman, Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital, in: American Journal of Sociology 94, 1989, Supplement, pp. S95-S120, here pp. S117-S119
2. R.D. Putnam/R. Leonardi/R.Y. Nanetli, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy, Princeton, NJ 1993, esp. pp. 163-85
3. F. Fukuyama, Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity, New York 1995, esp. pp. 1-57, 345-53
4. R. D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: the Collapse and Revival of American Community, New York 2000, pp. 319, 322-3, 325, 346-7
5. K.J. Arrow, Observations on Social Capital, in: P. Dasgupta/I. Serageldin (eds.), Social Capital: A Multifaceted Perspective, Washington, 2000, pp. 3-5, here p. 5
6. Putnam et al., Making Democracy Work, pp. 121, 162
7. Fukuyama, Trust, pp. 1-57, 345-53
8. Arrow, Observations
9. R.M. Solow, Notes on Social Capital and Economic Performance, in: Dasgupta/Serageldin, Social Capital, pp. 6-12
10. Coleman, Social Capital
11. Solow, Some Notes, pp. 7-8
12. D. Gambetta, Can We Trust Trust?, in: D. Gambetta (ed.), Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations, Oxford 1988, pp. 213-37
13. D. Narayan/L. Pritchett, Social Capital: Evidence and Implications, in: Dasgupta/Serageldin, Social Capital, pp. 269-95
14. Narayan/Pritchett, Social Capital
15. The social capital literature generally avoids discussing what these costs must be, but at the least they must include the opportunity cost of the time and other resources devoted to fostering interpersonal relationships within social networks, and in principle they should also include any negative externalities resulting from actions taken by the network. For exceptional contributions that consider the costs as well as the benefits of social capital and trust, see P. Dasgupta, Economic Progress and the Idea of Social Capital, in: Dasgupta/Serageldin, Social Capital, pp. 325-424, here e.g. pp. 327, 344-7, 367
16. and P. Dasgupta, Social Capital and Economic Progress: Analytics, in: E. Ostrom/T. K. Ahn (eds.), Social Capital: a Reader, Cheltenham 2003, here esp. p. 310
17. P. Dasgupta, Trust as a Commodity, in: Gambetta, Trust, pp. 49-72, here 64
18. United Nations Development Program, Human Development Report 1993, Oxford 1993, p. 8
19. World Bank, The World Bank and Participation, Washington, 1994, p. i
20. E.A. Brett, The Participatory Principle in Development Projects: the Costs and Benefits of Cooperation, in: Public Administration and Development 16, 1996, pp. 5-19, here esp. pp. 5-6
21. M. Raiser, Informal Institutions, Social Capital and Economic Transition, in: G.A. Cornia/V. Popov (eds.), Transition and Institutions. The Experience of Gradual and Late Reformers, Oxford 2001, pp. 218-39
22. J. Stiglitz, New Bridges across the Chasm: Institutional Strategies for the Transition Economies (World Bank, 8 Dec. 1999). http://wbln0018. worldbank.org/eca/eca.nsf/0/0ac8adc7b03aca0885256847004e2b82? OpenDocument
23. United Nations Development Program, Human Development Report 1993, esp. p. 8
24. World Bank, The World Bank and Participation, esp.p. i
25. Dasgupta/Serageldin, Social Capital
26. For an excellent recent exception, see N. Molenaers, Associations or Informal Networks? Social Capital and Local Development Practices, in: M. Hooghe/D. Stolle (eds.), Generating Social Capital: Civil Society and Institutions in Comparative Perspective, New York 2003, pp. 113-132, here esp. p. 122
27. Compact Oxford English Dictionary, Oxford 1991, p. 2122, panel 623
28. See the discussion of the social and economic significance of trust in Dasgupta, Trust, pp. 49-51, 55, 61
29. Gambetta, Can We Trust Trust?, pp. 217-20
30. Putnam, Bowling Alone, pp. 134-47
31. For a criticism of this tendency in the literature on trust and social capital, particularly in the work of Robert Putnam, see Stolle/Hooghe, Conclusion, in: Hooghe/Stolle (eds.), Generating Social Capital, pp. 231-48, here esp. p. 244
32. and P. Seabright, Is Cooperation Habit-Forming?, in: P. Dasgupta/K.-G. Mäler (eds.), The Environment and Emerging Development Issues, 2 vols., Oxford 1997, vol. 2, pp. 283-307
33. For a description of this kind of trust in the context of the Italian mafia, see D. Gambetta, Mafia: the Price of Distrust, in: Gambetta, Trust, pp. 159-75, here pp. 165-6
34. For a synoptic view of the origins and economic implications of generalized trust in strangers, see P. Seabright, The Company of Strangers: a Natural History of Economic Life, Princeton 2004
35. On the centrality of generalized trust to the social capital literature, see Stolle/Hooghe, Conclusion, pp. 232-3
36. P. Bardhan, The Nature of Institutional Impediments to Economic Development, Center for International and Development Economics Research Paper C96-066 (March 3, 1996). http://repositories.cdlib.org/iber/cider/C96-066, here pp. 6-7
37. On the relevance of guilds and social capital to modern transition economies, see Stiglitz, New Bridges
38. Raiser, Informal Institutions, here p. 231
39. On the Low Countries, see P. Stabel, Guilds in Late Medieval Flanders: Myths and Realities of Guild Life in an Export-Oriented Environment, in: Journal of Medieval History 30, 2004, pp. 187-212, here p. 194
40. J. Mokyr, The Industrial Revolution and the Netherlands: Why Did It Not Happen?, paper presented to the 150th Anniversary Conference Organized by the Royal Dutch Economic Association, 10-11 Dec. 1999, pp. 10-12
41. On the weakening even of the most powerful guilds in England, the London livery companies, from the sixteenth century on, see J.R. Kellett, The Breakdown of Guild and Corporation Control of the Handicraft and Retail Trades in London, in: Economic History Review, 2nd ser. 10, 1958), pp. 381-94
42. and the essays in I.A. Gadd/P. Wallis (eds.), Guilds, Society, and Economy in London, 1450-1800, London 2002
43. For a comparative discussion in the context of proto-industries, see S. Ogilvie, State Corporatism and Proto-Industry: the Württemberg Black Forest, 1580-1797, Cambridge 1997, pp. 412-37
44. See the evidence in J. Ehmer, Traditionelles Denken und neue Fragestellungen zur Geschichte von Handwerk und Zunft, in: F. Lenger (ed.), Handwerk, Hausindustrie und die Historische Schule der Nationalökonomie. Wissenschafts- und gewerbegeschichtliche Perspektiven, Bielefeld 1998, pp. 19-77, here pp. 36-7, 54
45. Ogilvie, State Corporatism, pp. 72-9, 419-37
46. U. Pfister, Craft Guilds and Proto-Industrialization in Europe, 16th to 18th Centuries, in: S.R. Epstein/H.G. Haupt/C. Poni/H. Soly (eds.), Guilds, Economy and Society, Seville 1998, pp. 11-24, here 11-14
47. and W. Reininghaus, Gewerbe in der frühen Neuzeit, Munich 1990, pp. 61-3, 71-2, 79-80
48. On this bifurcation, see Mokyr, Industrial Revolution, pp. 10-12
49. On the resurgence of guild power in the United Provinces, see S. Bos/P. Lourens/J. Lucassen, Die Zünfte in der niederländischen Republik, in: H.-G. Haupt (ed.), Das Ende der Zünfte. Ein europäischer Vergleich, Göttingen 2002, pp. 127-53, here pp. 128-9
50. J. de Vries/A.M. van der Woude, The First Modern Economy: Success, Failure, and Perseverance of the Dutch Economy, 1500-1815, Cambridge 1997, pp. 162-3, 2934, 340-1, 581-3
51. U. Pfister, 'The Craft Guild as a Firm' or 'Guilds and Proto-Industrialization in Europe, 16th to 18th Centuries', paper delivered at the conference 'Guilds and Non-Industrial Worlds, Utrecht University, 21-22 January 2000, here pp. 12-13
52. J.L. van Zanden, The Rise and Decline of Holland's Economy: Merchant Capitalism and the Labour Market, Manchester 1993, pp. 127-40
53. On the restriction of guilds in the Southern Netherlands almost exclusively to urban agglomerations, see C. Lis/H. Soly, Die Zünfte in den österreichischen Niederlanden, in: Haupt, Ende der Zünfte, pp. 155-80, here p. 157 ; these authors nevertheless differ from Mokyr in arguing (e.g. on pp. 155-6) that Flemish guilds retained economic importance into the eighteenth century
54. S. Ogilvie, Social Institutions and Proto-Industrialization, in: S. Ogilvie/M. Cerman (eds.), European Proto-Industrialization, Cambridge 1996, pp. 23-37, here pp. 30-3
55. Pfister, Craft Guilds, pp. 11-14
56. Pfister, The Craft Guild as a Firm, p. 1
57. See the studies surveyed in Ehmer, Traditionelles Denken, pp. 36-7
58. Ogilvie, Social Institutions, pp. 30-3
59. For a detailed discussion of why one cannot assume (as some theorists do) that an institution such as the guild is efficient or beneficial simply because it is widespread and long-lived, see S. Ogilvie, Guilds, Efficiency, and Social Capital: Evidence from German Proto-Industry, in: Economic History Review 52, 2004, pp. 286-333, here esp. pp. 329-31
60. S. Ogilvie, A Bitter Living: Women, Markets, and Social Capital in Early Modern Germany, Oxford 2003, esp. pp. 340-52
61. Bos/Lourens/Lucassen, Zünfte, pp. 134-5
62. J. Forbes, Search, Immigration and the Goldsmiths Company: a Study in the Decline of its Powers, in: I.A. Gadd/P. Wallis (eds.), Guilds, Society, and Economy in London, 1450-1800, London 2002, pp. 115-25, here pp. 120-1
63. I.A. Gadd/P. Wallis, Introduction, in: Gadd/Wallis, Guilds, pp. 1-14, here p. 7
64. K. Stuart, Defiled Trades and Social Outcasts: Honor and Ritual Pollution in Early Modern Germany, Cambridge 2000, pp. 213-9
65. Stabel, Guilds, pp. 194-5
66. J. Lucassen/M. Prak, Guilds and Society in the Dutch Republic (16th-18th Centuries), in: Epstein/Haupt/Poni/Soly (eds.), Guilds, Economy and Society (Sevilla 1998, pp. 63-77, here pp. 66-7
67. Gadd/Wallis, Introduction, pp. 6, 9-10
68. Ogilvie, Guilds, Efficiency, and Social Capital, p. 323
69. P. Wallis, Controlling Commodities: Search and Reconciliation in the Early Modern Livery Companies, in: Gadd/ Wallis, Guilds, pp. 85-100, here p. 91
70. On the importance early modern guilds attached to lobbying at all levels of the political process, see, for instance, Forbes, Search, p. 117
71. R. F. Homer, The Pewterers Company's Country Searches and the Company's Regulation of Prices, in: Gada/Wallis, Guilds, pp. 101-13
72. B. Gustafsson, The Rise and Economic Behaviour of Medieval Craft Guilds, in: Scandinavian Economic History Review 35, 1987, pp. 1-40
73. R. Reith, Technische Innovation im Handwerk der frühen Neuzeit? Traditionen, Probleme und Perspektiven der Forschung, in: K. H. Kaufhold/W. Reininghaus (eds.), Stadt und Handwerk in Mittelalter und Früher Neuzeit, Cologne 2000, pp. 21-60, here 49-53
74. S.R. Epstein, Craft Guilds, Apprenticeship, and Technological Change in Pre-Industrial Europe, in: Journal of Economic History 58, 1998, pp. 684-713, here pp. 688-93
75. Epstein, Craft Guilds, pp. 693-705
76. Reith, Technische Innovation, pp. 45-8
77. Gustafsson, Rise, pp. 5, 13-24
78. Lis/Soly, Zünfte, pp. 165-6
79. H. Bräuer, Entwicklungstendenzen und Perspektiven der Erforschung sächsischer Zunfthandwerksgeschichte, in: Jahrbuch für Regionalgeschichte und Landeskunde, 19, 1993/4), pp. 5-65, here p. 37
80. Wallis, Controlling Commodities, p. 86
81. On this see, for instance, J. Schlumbohm, Gesetze, die nicht durchgesetzt werden - ein Strukturmerkmal des frühneuzeitlichen Staates?, in: Geschichte und Gesellschaft 23, 1997, pp. 647-63
82. For early examples of evasion of even the most powerful London guilds, see Homer, The Pewterers Company's Country Searches, pp. 106-7
83. G.A. Akerlof, The Market for 'Lemons': Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, in: Quarterly Journal of Economics 84, 1970, pp. 488-500
84. Homer, The Pewterers Company's Country Searches, p. 107
85. For the general argument that less trust and cooperation may sometimes be beneficial because of the positive influence of a certain dose of competition, see Gambetta, Can We Trust Trust?, p. 214
86. As argued for the successful West Riding woollen and worsted industries in H. Heaton, The Yorkshire Woollen and Worsted Industries from the Earliest Times up to the Industrial Revolution, Oxford 1965, pp. 417-18
87. Quoted in E. Lipson, The History of the Woollen and Worsted Industries, London 1965; 1st edn 1921), p. 118
88. R.S. DuPlessis, One Theory, Two Draperies, Three Provinces, and a Multitude of Fabrics: the New Drapery of French Flanders, Hainaut, and the Toumaisis, c. 1500-c. 1800, in: N.B. Harte (ed.). The New Draperies in the Low Countries and England, Oxford 1997, pp. 129-72, here p. 159
89. Heaton, Yorkshire, p. 58
90. On quality regulation by municipal and princely authorities in Montpellier in the 1350s, see K.L. Reyerson, Commercial Fraud in the Middle Ages: the Case of the Dissembling Pepperer, in: Journal of Modern History 8, 1982, pp. 63-74, here pp. 63, 67
91. For examples of early modern industries in which inadequate guild quality controls were replaced by merchant, municipal, or state inspections, see K. Finkenwirth, Urkundliche Geschichte der Gera-Greizer Wollwarenindustrie von 1572 bis zur Neuzeit, Weida 1910, pp. 41, 62, 66
92. J. Torras, The Old and the New: Marketing Networks and Textile Growth in Eighteenth-Century Spain, in: M. Berg (ed.), Markets and Manufacture in Early Industrial Europe, London 1991, pp. 93-113, here p. 105
93. J. Torras, From Craft to Class: the Changing Organisation of Cloth Manufacturing in a Catalan Town, in: T. Safley/L. Rosenband (eds.), The Workplace before the Factory: Artisans and Proletarians, 1500-1800, Ithaca 1993, pp. 165-79, here pp. 173-5
94. DuPlessis, One Theory, p. 153
95. For an illuminating example of how the mafia in southern Italy used its particularist and differential trust to create quality guarantees, but did not thereby serve socially beneficial ends, see Gambetta, Mafia, pp. 171-3
96. W. Troeltsch, Die Calwer Zeughandlungskompagnie und ihre Arbeiter, Jena 1897, p. 120
97. De Vries/Van der Woude, First Modern Economy, p. 582
98. M. Davies, Governors and Governed: the Practice of Power in the Merchant Taylors Company in the Fifteenth Century, in: Gadd/Wallis, Guilds, pp. 67-83, here p. 79
99. A.J. Randall, Before the Luddites: Custom, Community and Machinery in the English Woollen Industry, 1776-1809, Cambridge 1991, pp. 35-8
100. Davies, Practice of Power, p. 79
101. Lipson, History, p. 120
102. M.C. Howell, Achieving the Guild Effect without Guilds: Crafts and Craftsmen in Late Medieval Douai, in: P. Lambrechts/J.P. Sosson (eds.), Les métiers au Moyen Age, Louvain-la-Neuve 1994, pp. 109-28
103. J.H. Munro, The Origin of the English 'New Draperies': the Resurrection of an Old Flemish Industry, 1270-1570, in: Harte, New Draperies, pp. 35-128, here p. 87
104. J. Craeybeckx, Les industries dexportation dans les villes flamandes au XVIIe siècle au début du XVIIIe siècle, in: M. Spallanzani (ed.), Produzione, commercio, e consumo dei panni di lana nei secoli XII-XVIII, Florence 1976, pp. 475-510, here pp. 23, 40
105. P. Hudson, The Genesis of Industrial Capital: a Study of the West Riding Wool Textile Industry c. 1750-1850, Cambridge 1986, pp. 36, 156-7
106. P. Hudson, Capital and Credit in the West Riding Wool Textile Industry, c. 1750-1850, in: P. Hudson (ed.), Regions and Industries. A Perspective on the Industrial Revolution in Britain, Cambridge 1989, pp. 69-102, here p. 69-72
107. R. G. Wilson, The supremacy of the Yorkshire cloth industry in the eighteenth century, in: N.B. Harte/K.G. Ponting (eds.), Textile History and Economic History: Essays in Honour of Miss Julia de Lacy Mann, Manchester 1973, pp. 225-46, here pp. 244-5
108. Quoted in Forte, Search, p. 120
109. On the exclusionary functions of guilds, see J. Rule. The Property of Skill in the Period of Manufacture, in: P. Joyce (ed.), The Historical Meanings of Work, Cambridge 1987, pp. 99-118, here p. 107
110. D.M. Hafter, Women in the Underground Business of Eighteenth-Century Lyon, in: Enterprise and Society 2, 2001, pp. 11-40, here pp. 14-18, 27-32
111. P. Lourens/J. Lucassen, Gilden und Wanderung: die Niederlände, in: K. Schulz/E. Müller-Luckner (eds.), Handwerk in Europa vom Spätmittelalter bis zur Frühen Neuzeit, Munich 1999, pp. 65-79, here pp. 66-7, 75-9
112. K.D.M. Snell, Annals of the Labouring Poor: Social Change and Agrarian England, 1660-1900, Cambridge 1985, pp. 228-9, 278, 312-13
113. D. Simonton, Apprenticeship: Training and Gender in Eighteenth-Century England, in: Berg, Markets and Manufacture, pp. 227-258, here esp. p. 229
114. T.K. Dennison, Apprenticeship in 19th-century Russia: Evidence from Yaroslavl Province, paper presented at the European Social Science History Conference, Berlin, March 2004
115. Ogilvie, Bitter Living, pp. 98-9
116. G. Riello, The Shaping of a Family Trade: the Cordwainers Company in Eighteenth-Century London, in: Gadd/Wallis, Guilds, pp. 141-159, here p. 149
117. Riello, Shaping, pp. 150-2
118. L. Roper, The Holy Household: Women and Morals in Reformation Augsburg, Oxford 1989, pp. 44-9
119. Stuart, Defiled Trades, pp. 213-9
120. Hafter, Underground, pp. 14-18, 27-32
121. For examples of black-market producers more than skilled enough to compete with guild masters, see, for instance, Hafler, Underground, 16-8, 30-2
122. Lucassen/Prak, Guilds and Society, pp. 66-7
123. M.C. Howell, Women's Work in the New and Light Draperies of the Low Countries, in: Harte, New Draperies, pp. 197-216, here p. 200, 206-10, 212
124. Roper, Holy Household, pp. 44-9
125. Rule, Property, p. 107
126. K. Simon-Muscheid/G. Jacobsen, Resümee, in: K. Simon-Muscheid (ed.), Was nützt die Schusterin dem Schmied? Frauen und Handwerk vor der Industrialisierung, Frankfurt a.M. 1998, pp. 159-65, here p. 163
127. Simonton, Apprenticeship, 230
128. M. Sonenscher, The Hatters of Eighteenth-Century France, Berkeley 1987, pp. 35-6
129. M. van Dekken, Women and Work in the Early Modern Netherlands: the Production of and Trade in Beverages, paper presented at the European Social Science History Conference, Berlin, March 2004
130. S. Ogilvie, Women and Labour Markets in Early Modern Germany, in: Jahrbuch für Wirtschaftsgeschichte 2004/2, pp. 53-88, here esp. pp. 75-8
131. Snell, Annals, pp. 228-9, 278, 312-13
132. Dennison, Apprenticeship in 19th-century Russia
133. Randall, Before the Luddites, p. 33
134. De Vries/Van der Woude, First Modern Economy, pp. 598-600
135. Lourens/Lucassen, Gilden und Wanderung, pp. 77 with note 30
136. Ogilvie, A Bitter Living, pp. 96-9
137. For a detailed analysis of these issues across different European worsted industries, see Ogilvie, Guilds, Efficiency and Social Capital, pp. 312-14
138. Epstein, Craft guilds, pp. 693-705
139. J. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, New York 1942, esp. chapter 8
140. From a voluminous literature, see K. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in: R. Nelson (ed.), The Rate and Direction of Innovative Activity, Princeton 1962, pp. 609-25
141. and the studies surveyed in F. M. Scherer/D. Ross, Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance, 3rd edn, Boston 1990, pp. 630-51
142. See the discussion in Scherer/Ross, Industrial Market Structure, pp. 630-1, 644-51
143. On the key role played by lack of barriers to entry in theoretical models linking monopoly and innovation, see F. Etro, Innovation by Leaders, in: Economic Journal 114, 2004, pp. 281-303, here pp. 281-3, 287-9, 298, 300-01
144. Lourens/Lucassen, Gilden, pp. 73-5, 77, 79
145. Troeltsch, Zeughandlungskompagnie, pp. 165-6
146. See, for instance, A. Marshall, Principles of Eonomics, 8th edn, London, 1920; orig. publ. 1890), pp. 267-77
147. M. Fujita/J.-F. Thisse, Economics of Agglomeration, in: Journal of Japanese and International Economies 10, 1996, pp. 339-78, here pp. 339-41
148. Pfister, The Craft Guild as a Finn, pp. 13-14
149. J.K.J. Thomson, Proto-Industrialization in Spain, in: Ogilvie/Cerman (eds.), European Proto-industrialization, pp. 85-101, here p. 88
150. K. Basu, Analytical Development Economics: the Less Developed Economy Revisited, Cambridge, Mass. 1997, pp. 172-3
151. M.P. Todaro, Economic Development in the Third World, Harlow 1989, pp. 270-1
152. D. Ray, Economic Development, Princeton NJ 1998, pp. 261, 346-8, 395-6
153. D. Farrell, The Hidden Dangers of the Informal Economy, in: The McKinsey Quarterly 2004/3 [http://www.mckinseyquarterly.com/ article_page. aspx?ar= 1448&L2=19]
154. Howell, Achieving the Guild Effect, p. 124
155. L. Noordegraaf, The New Draperies in the Northern Netherlands, in: Harte, New Draperies, 173-96, here pp. 176, 179-83
156. Hudson, Capital, p. 72
157. S. Ogilvie, How Does Social Capital Affect Women? Guilds and Communities in Early Modern Germany, in: American Historical Review 109, 2004, pp. 325-59
158. R. Dessi/S. Ogilvie, Social Capital and Collusion: the Case of Merchant Guilds (Long Version), Cambridge Working Papers in Economics No. 417, March 2004
159. On guilds' discrimination against women, see Clasen, Augsburger, pp. 130-3, 323-5
160. R.M. Dekker, Women in Revolt: Collective Protest and its Social Basis in Holland, in: Theory and Society 16, 1987, pp. 337-62, here p. 347
161. M.C. Howell, Women, Production, and Patriarchy in Late Medieval Cities, Chicago 1986, pp. 70-94, 124-58, 167
162. E.W. Monter, Women in Calvinist Geneva, in: Signs 6, 1980, pp. 189-209, here pp. 202-3
163. E. Musgrave, Women and the Craft Guilds in Eighteenth-Century Nantes, in: G. Crossick (ed.), The Artisan and the European Town, 1500-1900, Aldershot, 1997, pp. 151-71, here p. 167
164. Ogilvie, How Does Social Capital Affect Women?
165. J.H. Quataert, The Shaping of Women's Work in Manufacturing: Guilds, Households and the State in Central Europe, 1648-1870, in: American Historical Review 90, 1985, pp. 1122-48, here pp. 1126-7, 1147-8
166. Wiesner, Working Women, pp. 150-1
167. Molenaers, Associations, pp. 126-7
168. Stuart, Kathy, Defiled Trades, pp. 213-9
169. For examples of guild lobbying of early modern governments for legislative favours, see Forbes, Search, pp. 117
170. Dessi/Ogilvie, Social Capital
171. As pointed out for modern LDCs by Dasgupta, Economic Progress and the Idea of Social Capital, here p. 367
172. Dasgupta, Social Capital and Economic Progress, p. 310