FDI and the costs of contract enforcement in developing countries

Policy Sciences

Volumn 43, Issue 2, 2010, Pages 181-200

  Ahlquist, John S ^a   Prakash, Aseem ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON   (United States)

Author keywords

Contract enforcement; Foreign investment; Globalization

Indexed keywords

CAPITAL MARKET; DATA SET; DEVELOPING WORLD; FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT; GLOBALIZATION; MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE; WORLD BANK;

EID: 77952319995     PISSN: 00322687     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11077-009-9093-3     Document Type: Article

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