Enlightened corporate governance: Specific investments by employees as legitimation for residual claims

Journal of Business Ethics

Volumn 93, Issue 4, 2010, Pages 641-651

  Brink, Alexander ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BAYREUTH   (Germany)

Author keywords

Agency theory; Business ethics; Corporate governance; Residual claim; Residual risk; Specific investment

Indexed keywords

EID: 77951978387     PISSN: 01674544     EISSN: 15730697     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10551-009-0245-3     Document Type: Article

References (66)

1. Akerlof, G. A.: 1970, The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, Quarterly Journal of Economics 84(3), pp. 488-500.
2. Alchian, A. A. and H. Demsetz: 1972, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, American Economic Review 62(5), pp. 777-795.
3. Bamberg, G. and K. Spremann (eds.): 1987, Agency Theory, Information, and Incentives, (Springer, Berlin).
4. Barnard, Ch. I.: 1938, The Functions of the Executive, (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass.).
5. Berle, A. A. and G. C. Means: 1932, The Modern Corporation and Private Property, (Macmillan, New York).
6. Blair, M. M.: 1995, Ownership and Control: Rethinking Corporate Governance for the Twenty-First Century, (The Brookings Institution, Washington, DC).
7. Blair, M. M.: 1998, For Whom Should Corporations be Run? An Economic Rationale for Stakeholder Management, Long Range Planning 31(2), pp. 195-200.
8. Blair, M. M.: 2003, 'Shareholder Value, Corporate Governance, and Corporate Performance', in P. K. Cornelius and B. Kogut (eds.), Corporate Governance and Capital Flows in a Global Economy, (Oxford Univ. Press, New York et al.), pp. 53-82.
9. Blair, M. M. and L. A. Stout: 1999, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, Virginia Law Review 85(2), pp. 247-328.
10. Blair, M. M. and L. A. Stout: 2001, Director Accountability and the Mediating Role of the Corporate Board, Washington University Law Quarterly 79(2), pp. 403-447.
11. Boatright, J. R.: 2002, Contractors as Stakeholders: Reconciling Stakeholder Theory with the Nexus-of-Contracts Firm, Journal of Banking and Finance 26(9), pp. 1837-1852.
12. Boatright, J. R.: 2004, Employee Governance and the Ownership of the Firm, Business Ethics Quarterly 14(1), pp. 1-21.
13. Boatright, J. R.: 2006, What's Wrong - and What's Right - with Stakeholder Management, Journal of Private Enterprise 21(2), 106-130.
14. Brink, A. and O. Karitzki: 2003, How Can We Act Morally in Merger Processes? A Stimulation Based on Implicit Contracts, Journal of Business Ethics 43(1/2), pp. 137-152.
15. Child, J. and S. B. Rodrigues: 2004, Repairing the Breach of Trust in Corporate Governance, Corporate Governance: An International Review, 12(2), pp. 143-152.
16. Clarkson, M. B. E.: 1995, A Risk Based Model of Stakeholder Theory. Proceedings of the Second Toronto Conference on Stakeholder Theory (Centre for Corporate Social Performance & Ethics, University of Toronto, Toronto).
17. Coase, R. H.: 1937, The Nature of the Firm, Economica 4(16), pp. 386-405.
18. Coase, R. H.: 1960. The Problem of Social Cost, The Journal of Law and Economics 3(1), pp. 1-44.
19. Daily, C. M., D. R. Dalton and A. A. Cannella Jr.: 2003, Corporate Governance: Decades of Dialogue and Data, Academy of Management Review 28(3), pp. 371-382.
20. Dalton, D. R., C. M. Daily, S. T. Certo and R. Roengpitya: 2003, Meta-Analyses of Financial Performance and Equity: Fusion or Confusion?, Academy of Management Journal 46(1), pp. 13-26.
21. Davis, J. H., F. D. Schoorman and L. Donaldson: 1997, Toward a Stewardship Theory of Management, Academy of Management Review 22(1), pp. 20-47.
22. Demb, A. and F.-F. Neubauer: 1992, The Corporate Board: Confronting the Paradoxes, Long Range Planning 25(3), pp. 9-20.
23. Eisenhardt, K. M.: 1989, Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review, Academy of Management Review 14(1), pp. 57-74.
24. Erlei, M., M. Leschke and D. Sauerland: 1999, Neue Institutionenökonomik, (Schäffer-Poeschel, Stuttgart).
25. Fama, E. F.: 1980, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, Journal of Political Economy 88(2), pp. 288-307.
26. Fama, E. F. and M. C. Jensen: 1983a, Agency Problems and Residual Claims, Journal of Law and Economics 26(2), pp. 327-349.
27. Fama, E. F. and M. C. Jensen: 1983b, Separation of Ownership and Control, Journal of Law and Economics 26(2), pp. 301-325.
28. Freeman, R. E.: 1984, Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach, (Pitman, Boston, Mass.).
29. Freeman, R. E.: 2004, The Stakeholder Approach Revisited, Zeitschrift für Wirtschafts- und Unternehmensethik 5(3), pp. 228-241.
30. Furubotn, E. G. and R. Richter. (2005) Institutions & Economic Theory. The Contribution of the New Institutional Economics 2nd ed. The University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, Mich.
31. Göbel, E.: 2002, Neue Institutionenökonomik. Konzeptionen und betriebswirtschaftliche Anwendungen, (UTB: Stuttgart).
32. Grossman, S. and O. Hart: 1986, The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration, Journal of Political Economy 94(4), pp. 691-719.
33. Hart, O.: 1989, An Economist's Perspective on the Theory of the Firm, Columbia Law Review 89(7), pp. 1757-1774.
34. Hart, O.: 1995, Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure, (Oxford University Press, Oxford).
35. Hart, O. and J. Moore: 1990, Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm, Journal of Political Economy 98(6), pp. 1119-1158.
36. Hill, C. W. L. and T. M. Jones: 1992, Stakeholder-Agency Theory, Journal of Management Studies 29(2), pp. 131-154.
37. Holmstrom, B.: 1982, Moral Hazard in Teams, Bell Journal of Economics 13(2), pp. 324-340.
38. Jansson, E.: 2005, The Stakeholder Model: The Influence of the Ownership and Governance Structures, Journal of Business Ethics 56(1), pp. 1-13.
39. Jensen, M. C.: 1983, Organization Theory and Methodology, Accounting Review 58(2), pp. 319-339.
40. Jensen, M. C.: 2002, Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory and the Corporate Objective Function, Business Ethics Quarterly 12(2), pp. 235-256.
41. Jensen, M. C. and W. H. Meckling: 1976, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, Journal of Financial Economics 3(4), pp. 305-360.
42. Kaufman, A. and E. Englander: 2005, A Team Production Model of Corporate Governance, Academy of Management Executive 19(3), pp. 9-22.
43. Kay, J.: 1996, The Business of Economics, (Oxford University Press, Oxford et al.).
44. Klein, B., R. G. Crawford and A. A. Alchian: 1978, Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process, Journal of Law and Economics 21(2), pp. 297-326.
45. Lewis, T. J., S. Machold, D. Oxtoby and P. K. Ahmed: 2004, Employee Roles in Governance: Contrasting the UK and German Experience, Corporate Governance 4(4), pp. 16-28.
46. Mahoney, J., C. C. Asher and J. Mahoney: 2004, Towards a Property Rights Foundation for a Stakeholder Theory of the Firm. Working Paper 04-0116, UIUC College of Business, Urbana, IL, www. business. uiuc. edu/Working_Papers/papers/04-0116. pdf.
47. Marcoux, A. M.: 2003, A Fiduciary Argument against Stakeholder Theory, Business Ethics Quarterly 13(1), pp. 1-24.
48. Monks, R. A. G. and N. Minow: 1995, Corporate Governance, (Blackwell Business, Cambridge, Mass.).
49. Olson, M. (1965) The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and The Theory of Groups. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass.
50. Prahalad, C. K.: 1997, 'Corporate Governance or Corporate Value Added? Rethinking the Primacy of Shareholder Value', in D. Chew (ed.), Studies in International Corporate Finance and Governance Systems, (Oxford University Press, New York et al.), pp. 46-56.
51. Pratt, J. W. and R. J. Zeckhauser: 1985, 'Principals and Agents: An Overview', in J. Pratt and R. Zeckhauser (eds.), Principals and Agents: The Structure of Business, (Harvard Business School Press, Boston, Mass.), pp. 1-35.
52. Rajan, R. G. and L. Zingales: 1998, Power in a Theory of the Firm, The Quarterly Journal of Economics 113(2), pp. 387-432.
53. Roberts, J. and E. van den Steen: 2003, 'Human Capital and Corporate Governance', in J. Schwalbach (ed.), Corporate Governance. Essays in Honor of Horst Albach, 2. Aufl., (Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, Berlin), pp. 126-142.
54. Ross, S. A.: 1987, The Interrelations of Finance and Economics: Theoretical Perspectives, American Economic Review 77(2), pp. 29-34.
55. Schmidt, R. H.: 1997, Corporate Governance: The Role of Other Constituencies. Working Paper Series: Finance and Accounting, Vol. 3, Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universität, Frankfurt a. M.
56. Shleifer, A. and R. Vishny: 1986, Large Shareholders and Corporate Control, Journal of Political Economy 94(3), pp. 461-488.
57. Stiglitz, J.: 1989, 'Principal and Agent', in J. Eatwell, M. Murray and P. Newman (eds.), The New Palgrave: Allocation, Information and Markets, (Macmillan, London), pp. 241-253.
58. Tricker, R. I.: 1994, International Corporate Governance, (Simon & Schuster, Singapore).
59. Turnbull, S.: 1997, Corporate Governance: Its Scope, Concerns and Theories, Corporate Governance: An International Review 5(4), pp. 180-205.
60. Williamson, O. E.: 1979, Transaction Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations, Journal of Law and Economics 22(2), pp. 233-261.
61. Williamson, O. E.: 1985, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism: Firms, Markets, Relational Contracting, (Free Press, New York).
62. Williamson, O. E.: 1989/1996, 'Transaction Cost Economics', in O. E. Williamson (ed.), The Mechanisms of Governance (Oxford University Press, New York), pp. 54-87.
63. Williamson, O. E.: 1990/1996, 'Chester Barnard and the Incipient Science of Organization', in O. E. Williamson (ed.), The Mechanisms of Governance (Oxford University Press, New York), pp. 29-53.
64. Williamson, O. E.: 1998, Transaction Cost Economics: How it Works; Where it is Headed, De Economist 146(1), pp. 23-58.
65. Zingales. L.: 1998, 'Corporate Governance', in P. Newman (ed.), The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law, (Macmillan, New York), pp. 497-503.
66. Zingales, L.: 2000, In Search of New Foundations, Journal of Finance 55(4), pp. 1623-1653.