For whom should corporations be run?: An economic rationale for stakeholder management

Long Range Planning

Volumn 31, Issue 2, 1998, Pages 195-200

  Blair, Margaret M ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0347241311     PISSN: 00246301     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0024-6301(98)00003-X     Document Type: Article

References (8)

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3. F. H. Easterbrook and D. R. Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law, Harvard University Press, (1991).
4. E. F. Fama and M. C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, Journal of Law and Economics 26 (1983).
5. O. Hart, An Economist's Perspective on the Theory of the Firm, Columbia Law Review 89 (1989).
6. M. C. Jensen and W. H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, Journal of Financial Economics 3 (1900).
7. B. Klein, R. Crawford and A. Alchian, Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process, Journal of Law and Economics 21 (1978).
8. R. C. Topel, Specific Capital and Unemployment: Measuring the Costs and Consequences of Job Loss, In A. H. Meltzer and C. I. Plosser (eds), Studies in Labor Economics in Honor of Walter y. Oi, North Holland (1990).