The Becker paradox and type I versus type II errors in the economics of crime

International Economic Review

Volumn 48, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 211-233

  Persson, Mats ^b   Siven, Claes Henric ^a  

^a STOCKHOLM UNIVERSITY   (Sweden)

^b NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33846896735     PISSN: 00206598     EISSN: 14682354     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2354.2007.00423.x     Document Type: Article

References (17)

1. ANDREONI, J., "Reasonable Doubt and the Optimal Magnitude of Fines: Should the Penalty Fit the Crime?" RAND Journal of Economics 22 (1991), 385-95.
2. BECKER, G., "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," Journal of Political Economy 76 (1968), 169-217.
3. BURDETT, K., R. LAGOS, AND R. WRIGHT, "An On-the-Job Search Model of Crime, Inequality and Unemployment," International Economic Review 45 (2004), 681-706.
4. FRIEDMAN, D., "Why Not Hang Them All: The Virtues of Inefficient Punishment," Journal of Political Economy 107 (1999), S259-69.
5. HARRIS, J. R., "On the Economics of Law and Order," Journal of Political Economy 78 (1970), 165-74.
6. HUANG, C.-C., D. LAING, AND P. WANG, "Crime and Poverty: A Search Theoretic Approach," International Economic Review 45 (2004), 909-37.
7. KAPLOW, L., AND S. SHAVELL, "Accuracy in the Determination of Liability," Journal of Law and Economics 37 (1994), 1-15.
8. MURPHY, K. M., A. SHLEIFER, AND R. W. VISHNY, "Why Is Rent-Seeking so Costly to Growth?" American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings 83 (1993), 409-14.
9. NALEBUFF, B., AND D. SCHARFSTEIN, "Testing in Models of Assymmetric Information," Review of Economic Studies 54 (1987), 265-77.
10. PERSSON, M., AND C.-H. SIVEN, "Incentive and Incarceration Effects in a General Equilibrium Model of Crime," Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 59 (2006), 214-29.
11. PERSSON, T., AND G. TABELLINI, Political Economics. Explaining Economic Policy (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000).
12. PNG, I. P. L., "Optimal Subsidies and Damages in the Presence of Judicial Error," International Review of Law and Economics 6 (1986), 101-5.
13. ROINE, J., "The Political Economics of Not Paying Taxes," Public Choice 126 (2006), 107-34.
14. RUBINFELD, D. L., AND D. E. M. SAPPINGTON, "Efficient Awards and Standards of Proof in Judicial Proceedings," The RAND Journal of Economics 18 (1987), 308-15.
15. SAH, R. K., "Social Osmosis and Patterns of Crime," Journal of Political Economy 94 (1991), 1272-95.
16. STIGLER, G. J. "The Optimum Enforcement of Laws," Journal of Political Economy 78 (1970), 526-36.
17. TULLOCK, G., Trials on Trial: The Pure Theory of Legal Procedure (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980).