Incentive contracts with enforcement costs

Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization

Volumn 26, Issue 1, 2010, Pages 115-143

  Doornik, Katherine ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 77249102041     PISSN: 87566222     EISSN: 14657341     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/jleo/ewn017     Document Type: Article

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