Fault tolerance in large games

Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce

Volumn , Issue , 2008, Pages 274-283

  Gradwohl, Ronen ^a   Reingold, Omer ^a  

^a WEIZMANN INSTITUTE OF SCIENCE   (Israel)

Author keywords

Byzantine faults; Large games; Nash equilibrium

Indexed keywords

BYZANTINE FAULT; FAULT-TOLERANT; NASH EQUILIBRIUM; NASH STRATEGY; NON-TRIVIAL; OPTIMAL STRATEGIES;

ELECTRIC CONDUCTIVITY MEASUREMENT; ELECTRONIC COMMERCE; QUALITY ASSURANCE; TELECOMMUNICATION NETWORKS;

FAULT TOLERANCE;

EID: 75349089930     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/1386790.1386833     Document Type: Conference Paper

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