Compensation across executive labor markets: What can we learn from cross-listed firms

Journal of International Business Studies

Volumn 41, Issue 1, 2010, Pages 70-87

  Southam, Colette ^a   Sapp, Stephen ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WESTERN ONTARIO   (Canada)

Author keywords

Bonding; CEO compensation; Cross listing; Labor market; Market segmentation

Indexed keywords

EID: 72449196209     PISSN: 00472506     EISSN: 14786990     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1057/jibs.2009.34     Document Type: Article

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