A framed field experiment on collective enforcement mechanisms with Ethiopian farmers

Environment and Development Economics

Volumn 14, Issue 5, 2009, Pages 641-663

  Reichhuber, Anke ^a   Camacho, Eva ^b   Requate, Till ^c  

^a WORLD BANK   (United States)

^b UNIVERSIDAD AUTÓNOMA DE MADRID   (Spain)

^c UNIVERSITY OF KIEL   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 71749089443     PISSN: 1355770X     EISSN: 14697998     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S1355770X09005178     Document Type: Article

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