Select your committee: The impact of central bankers' background on inflation

Economie Internationale

Volumn 117, Issue 1, 2009, Pages 99-129

  Farvaque, Étienne ^a   Hammadou, Hakim ^a   Stanek, Piotr ^b  

^a UNIV LILLE   (France)

^b CRACOW UNIVERSITY OF ECONOMICS   (Poland)

Author keywords

Central banking; Committees; Governance; Infl ation

Indexed keywords

EID: 70450158433     PISSN: 12408095     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

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