A long history of FOMC voting behavior

Southern Economic Journal

Volumn 66, Issue 4, 2000, Pages 906-922

  Chappell Jr , Henry W ^a   McGregor, Rob Roy ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH CAROLINA   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA AT CHARLOTTE   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0034380278     PISSN: 00384038     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/1061535     Document Type: Review

References (23)

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