Perception and politics in intelligence assessment: U.S. estimates of the Soviet and "rogue-state" nuclear threats

International Studies Perspectives

Volumn 10, Issue 4, 2009, Pages 394-412

  Lebovic, James H ^a  

^a GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

CIA; Intelligence; Nuclear weapons; Rogue states; Soviet Union; Threat

Indexed keywords

GOVERNMENT RELATIONS; NUCLEAR WEAPON; PERCEPTION; POLITICAL ORGANIZATION; POLITICS; SECURITY THREAT;

NORTH AMERICA; UNITED STATES; USSR;

EID: 70449686991     PISSN: 15283577     EISSN: 15283585     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1528-3585.2009.00385.x     Document Type: Article

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