Reports, politics, and intelligence failures: The case of Iraq

Journal of Strategic Studies

Volumn 29, Issue 1, 2006, Pages 3-52

  Jervis, Robert ^a  

^a Och Spine at New York Presbyterian Hospitals   (United States)

Author keywords

Intelligence; Intelligence failures; Iraqi WMD; Official inquiries

Indexed keywords

GEOPOLITICS;

ASIA; EURASIA; IRAQ; MIDDLE EAST;

EID: 33645580856     PISSN: 01402390     EISSN: 1743937X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/01402390600566282     Document Type: Review

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