September 11 and the adaptation failure of U.S. intelligence agencies

International Security

Volumn 29, Issue 4, 2005, Pages 78-111

  Zegart, Amy B ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 85047692546     PISSN: 01622889     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/isec.2005.29.4.78     Document Type: Review

References (193)

1. Eleanor Hill, "The Intelligence Community's Knowledge of the September 11 Hijackers Prior to September 11, 2001," testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence [SSCI] and House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence [HPSCI], 107th Cong., 2nd sess., September 20, 2002, p. 6.
2. George Tenet, testimony before the SSCI and HPSCI, 107th Cong., 2nd sess., October 17, 2002.
3. Tenet issued the memo on December 4, 1998.Excerpts can be found in Eleanor Hill, "Joint Inquiry Staff Statement, Part I," SSCI and HPSCI, 107th Cong., 2nd sess., September 18, 2002, p. 12.
4. For threat reporting, see The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (New York: W.W. Norton, 2004), pp. 254-263.
5. In addition to the CIA, the intelligence community consists of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (formerly the National Imagery and Mapping Agency), the National Reconnaissance Office, the National Security Agency, and intelligence units in the Air Force, the Army, the Coast Guard, the Navy, the Marine Corps, the State Department, the Energy Department, and the Treasury Department. In 2003 the creation of the Department of Homeland Security added a fifteenth agency to the community.
6. Hill, "The Intelligence Community's Knowledge of the September 11 Hijackers Prior to September 11, 2001," pp. 7-8.
7. The Joint Inquiry unearthed a December 1999 memo providing general guidance about placing terrorists on the State Department's watch list, but the investigation found no routine or formal programs in place to ensure that adding names to the watch list received regular attention. Nor were there any consistent guidelines about thresholds for placing suspected terrorists on the watch list. Tenet testimony before SSCI and HPSCI, October 17, 2002;
8. Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities before and after the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001, report of the U.S. Select Committee on Intelligence and U.S. House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, S. Report No. 107-351, H. Report No. 107-792, 107th Cong., 2d sess., December 2002 [here-after Joint Inquiry Final Report], p. 147.
9. Hill, "The Intelligence Community's Knowledge of the September 11 Hijackers Prior to September 11, 2001," p. 8.
10. Samuel L. Berger, testimony before the National Commission on Terrorist Acts upon the United States, eighth public hearing, "Counterterrorism Policy," March 24, 2004, http://www.9-11commission.gov/hearings/hearing8/ berger_statement.pdf.
11. Robert Gates, quoted in John H. Hedley, "The Intelligence Community: Is it Broken? How to Fix It?" Studies in Intelligence, Vol. 39, No. 5 (1996), p. 14.
12. National foreign intelligence program budgets declined every year between 1990 and 1996 and, with the exception of one large 1999 supplemental, remained basically flat between 1996 and 2000. The 9/11 Commission Report, p. 93.
13. Joint Inquiry Final Report, pp. 254, 257.
14. Ibid., p. 4.
15. The 9/11 Commission Report, p. 76.
16. This information was provided to the Joint Inquiry by former National Security Adviser Samuel Berger. See ibid., p. 12.
17. George Tenet, "Worldwide Threat-Converging Dangers in a Post 9/11 World," testimony before the SSCI, 107th Cong., 1st sess., February 6, 2002.
18. See in particular Thomas Powers, "The Trouble with the CIA," New York Review of Books, January 17, 2002, http://www.nybooks.com/articles/ 15109.
19. Interview, Washington, D.C., April 17, 2002.
20. James G. March, "Footnotes to Organizational Change," Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 26, No. 4 (December 1981), p. 563.
21. Michael T. Hannan and John Freeman, "Structural Inertia and Organizational Change," American Sociological Review, Vol. 49, No. 2 (April 1984), p. 151.
22. R. James Woolsey, "World Trouble Spots," testimony before the SSCI, 103d Cong., 2d sess., Jan uary 25, 1994;
23. R. James Woolsey, "World Threat Assessment Brief," testimony before the SSCI, 104th Cong., 1st sess., January 10, 1995;
24. John Deutch, "Worldwide Threats to U.S. National Security," testimony before the SSCI, 104th Cong., 2d sess., February 22, 1996;
25. George Tenet, "Worldwide Threats to National Security," testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 105th Cong., 1st sess., February 6, 1997;
26. George Tenet, "Worldwide Threats to National Security," testimony before the SSCI, 105th Cong., 2d sess., January 28, 1998;
27. George Tenet, "Worldwide Threats to U.S. National Security," testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 106th Cong., 1st sess., February 2, 1999;
28. George Tenet, "Annual Assessment of Security Threats against the United States," testimony before the SSCI, 106th Cong., 2d sess., February 2, 2000;
29. and George Tenet, "Worldwide Threats to National Security," testimony before the SSCI, 107th Cong., 1st sess., February 7, 2001.
30. Hill, "Joint Inquiry Staff Statement, Part I."
31. Among these were the 1993 World Trade Center attack, the 1993 New York City landmarks plot; the 1995 Bojinka plot, in which plans were uncovered in the Philippines to assassinate Pope John Paul II, bomb the U.S. and Israeli embassies in Manila, blow up several American aircraft flying Asian routes, and crash an airplane into CIA headquarters; and the 1999 disruption of the millennium attack against Los Angeles International Airport.
32. For an English translation of the fatwa, see http://www.fas.org/irp/ world/para/docs/980223-fatwa.htm.
33. Hill, "Joint Inquiry Staff Statement, Part I," p. 9.
34. The 9/11 Commission Report, p. 70.
35. Quotation from memo included in Hill, "Joint Inquiry Staff Statement, Part I," p. 12.
36. Hill, "Joint Inquiry Staff Statement, Part I," p. 12.
37. Tenet, "Worldwide Threats to U.S. National Security," testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 106th Cong., 1st sess., February 2, 1999.
38. Tenet, "Annual Assessment of Security Threats against the United States."
39. Tenet, "Worldwide Threats to National Security," testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 107th Cong., 1st sess., February 7, 2001.
40. Interview, Washington, D.C., April 17, 2002.
41. R. James Woolsey, remarks to the American Bar Association, Washington, D.C., April 29, 1994.
42. John P. O'Neill, excerpts from a speech to the National Strategy Forum, Chicago, Illinois, June 11, 1997, http://www.nationalstrategy.com/speakers/ oneill.html.
43. National Defense Panel, Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st Century, December 1, 1997, http://www.fas.org/man/docs/ndp;
44. and William S. Cohen, U.S. Department of Defense, Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review, May 1997, http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/qdr.
45. President William Clinton, "Remarks to the Opening Session of the 53rd United Nations General Assembly, United Nations," New York, New York, September 21, 1998, http://www.state.gov/www/global/terrorism/ 980921_pres_terror.html.
46. William S. Cohen, "Preparing for a Grave New World," Washington Post, July 26, 1999, p. A19.
47. Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the United States Intelligence Community [Aspin-Brown commission], Preparing for the 21st Century: An Appraisal of U.S. Intelligence (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office [U.S. GPO], 1996);
48. Commission to Assess the Organization of the Federal Government to Combat the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction [Deutch commission], Combating Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1999);
49. Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction [1999 Gilmore commission], First Annual Report to the President and the Congress: Assessing the Threat (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1999);
50. Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction [2000 Gilmore commission], Second Annual Report to the President and the Congress: Toward a National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 2000);
51. National Commission on Terrorism [Bremer commission], Countering the Changing Threat of International Terrorism (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 2000);
52. U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century [Hart-Rudman commission], Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 2001);
53. and Commission on the Advancement of Federal Law Enforcement [Webster commission], Law Enforcement in a New Century and a Changing World: Improving the Administration of Federal Law Enforcement (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 2000).
54. National Performance Review, "The Intelligence Community: Recommendations and Actions," in From Red Tape to Results: Creating a Government That Works Better and Costs Less (Washing ton, D.C.: U.S. GPO, September 1993);
55. National Performance Review, National Performance Review Phase II Initiatives: An Intelligence Community Report (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1995);
56. House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, IC21: The Intelligence Community in the 21st Century (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1996);
57. and Federal Bureau of Investigation, Draft FBI Strategic Plan: 1998-2003, Keeping Tomorrow Safe (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1998).
58. Council on Foreign Relations Independent Task Force, Making Intelligence Smarter: The Future of U.S. Intelligence (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1996);
59. Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on the Future of U.S. Intelligence, In from the Cold: The Report of the Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on the Future of U.S. Intelligence (New York: Twentieth Century Fund Press, 1996);
60. and National Institute for Public Policy, Modernizing Intelligence: Structure and Change for the 21st Century (Fairfax, Va.: National Institute for Public Policy, 2002).
61. Council on Foreign Relations Independent Task Force, Making Intelligence Smarter, p. 1.
62. House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, IC21, "Overview and Summary," p. 5.
63. Ibid., p. 7.
64. Ibid., p. 26.
65. Ibid., p. 28.
66. National Commission on Terrorism, Countering the Changing Threat of International Terrorism, p. iv.
67. Ibid., p. 13.
68. The Gilmore commission recommendations are from its 1999 and 2000 reports. The panel issued two other reports after September 11 that were not included.
69. Amy Zegart, "Blue Ribbons, Black Boxes: Toward a Better Understanding of Presidential Commissions," Presidential Studies Quarterly, Vol. 35, No. 2 (June 2004), pp. 366-393.
70. U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century, Road Map for National Security, p. x.
71. U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century, New World Coming: American Security in the 21st Century: Major Themes and Implications, September 15, 1999, p. 138.
72. Notable exceptions are Scott D. Sagan, The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press 1993);
73. and Lynn Eden, Whole World on Fire: Organizations, Knowledge, and Nuclear Weapons Devastation (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2003).
74. Glenn R. Carroll, "Organizational Ecology," Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 10 (1984), pp. 71-93;
75. Michael T. Hannan and John Henry Freeman, "The Population Ecology of Organizations," American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 82, No. 5 (March 1977), pp. 929-964;
76. Michael T. Hannan and John Henry Freeman, "Structural Inertia and Organizational Change," American Sociological Revieiv, Vol. 49, No. 2 (April 1984), pp. 149-164;
77. and Michael T. Hannan and John Henry Freeman, Organizational Ecology (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1989).
78. Joel A.C. Baum and Jitendra V. Singh, Evolutionary Dynamics of Organizations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994);
79. and Howard Aldrich, Organizations Evolving (London: Sage, 1999).
80. Barbara Levitt and James G. March, "Organizational Learning," Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 14 (1988), pp. 319-340;
81. Richard M. Cyert and James G. March, A Behavioral Theory of the Firm (London: Blackwell, 1963);
82. Mary Ann Glynn, Theresa K. Lant, and Frances J. Milliken, "Mapping Learning Processes in Organizations: A Multi-Level Framework Linking Learning and Organizing," in James R. Meindl, Joseph F. Porac, and Chuck Stubbart, eds., Advances in Managerial Cognition and Organizational Information Processing, Vol. 5 (Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, 1994), pp. 43-83;
83. Anne S. Miner and Stephen J. Mezias, "Ugly Duckling No More: Pasts and Futures of Organizational Learning Research," Organization Science, Vol. 7, No. 1 (January-February 1996), pp. 88-99;
84. and James G. March, "Exploration and Exploitation in Organizational Learning," Organization Science, Vol. 2, No. 1 (February 1991), pp. 71-87.
85. Cyert and March, A Behavioral Theory of the Firm, p. xi.
86. Aldrich's point should not be minimized. He notes that large, publicly traded corporations constitute less than 0.05 percent of all U.S. organizations using a corporate form. Aldrich, Organizations Evolving, p. 8.
87. For more on the difference between the private and public sectors, see James Q. Wilson, Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It (New York: Basic Books, 2000);
88. Terry M. Moe, "The Politics of Structural Choice: Toward a Theory of Public Bureaucracy," in Oliver E. Williamson, ed., Organization Theory: From Chester Barnard to the Present and Beyond (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 116-153;
89. and Terry M. Moe, "The New Economics of Organization," American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 28, No. 4 (November 1984), pp. 739-777.
90. For an overview of this approach, see Hannan and Freeman, "Structural Inertia and Organization Change";
91. and Hannan and Freeman, "The Population of Ecology Organizations."
92. Anthony Downs, Inside Bureaucracy (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967);
93. Arthur Stinchcombe, "Social Structures and Organizations," in James G. March, ed., Handbook of Organizations (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965), pp. 142-193;
94. Herbert Kaufman, Are Government Organizations Immortal? (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1976);
95. and Theodore J. Lowi, The End of Liberalism: The Second Republic of the United States (New York: W.W. Norton, 1979).
96. Kaufman, Are Government Agencies Immortal? p. 34. The durability of agencies has more recently come into question.
97. See David E. Lewis, Presidents and the Politics of Agency Design: Political Insulation in the United States Government Bureaucracy, 1946-1997 (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2003);
98. and Daniel P. Carpenter, The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy: Reputations, Networks, and Policy Innovation in Executive Agencies, 1862-1928 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2000).
99. Howard E. Aldrich, Organizations and Environments (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1979).
100. Aldrich, Organizations Evolving, p. 43.
101. Charles Perrow, Complex Organizations: A Critical Essay, 3d ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1986), p. 213.
102. Mathew D. McCubbins, "The Legislative Design of Regulatory Structure," American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 29, No. 4 (November 1985), pp. 721-748;
103. and Barry Weingast and Mark Moran, "Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission," Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 91, No. 5 (October 1983), pp. 775-800.
104. David Epstein and Sharyn O'Halloran make the distinction between ex ante and ongoing oversight mechanisms. Epstein and O'Halloran, "Administrative Procedures, Information, and Agency Discretion," American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 38, No. 3 (August 1994), pp. 697-722.
105. For ex ante controls, see Murray J. Horn, The Political Economy of Public Administration: Institutional Choice in the Public Sector (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995);
106. Mathew D. McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz, "Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrol versus Fire Alarm," American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 28, No. 1 (February 1984), pp. 165-179;
107. and Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger Noll, and Barry Weingast, "Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Vol. 3, No. 2 (Autumn 1987), pp. 243-277;
108. For ongoing controls, see Randall Calvert, Mark Moran, and Barry Weingast, "Congressional Influence over Policy Making: The Case of the FTC," in Mathew D. McCubbins and Terry Sullivan, eds., Congress: Structure and Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987);
109. and Randall Calvert, Mathew D. McCubbins, and Barry Weingast, "A Theory of Political Control and Agency Discretion," American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 33, No. 3 (August 1989), pp. 588-611. For how legislators choose between options,
110. see Kathleen Bawn, "Political Control versus Expertise: Congressional Choices about Administrative Procedures," American Political Science Review, Vol. 89, No. 1 (March 1995), pp. 62-73;
111. and David Epstein and Sharyn O'Halloran, Delegating Powers (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
112. Mathew D. McCubbins, "The Legislative Design of Regulatory Structure," American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 29, No. 4 (November 1985), p. 728.
113. Calvert, Moran, and Weingast, "Congressional Influence over Policy Making."
114. Terry M. Moe, "An Assessment of the Positive Theory of 'Congressional Dominance,'" Legislative Studies Quarterly, Vol. 12, No. 4 (November 1987), pp. 475-520.
115. Epstein and O'Halloran, Delegating Powers, p. 29.
116. I do not mean to suggest that all agency heads are so well intentioned and interested in maximizing organizational performance. Instead, the device is a heuristic used to tease out the ways in which agencies can be reformed and the forces that are likely to keep reforms from succeeding.
117. For an alternative view, see James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, Ambiguity and Choice in Organizations (Bergen, Norway: Universitetsforlaget, 1976).
118. Aldrich, Organizations Evolving, p. 262.
119. Proprietary data provided by Zagat to author, February 2, 2001.
120. Aldrich, Organizations Evolving, p. 257.
121. See also Joseph W. Duncan and Douglas P. Handler, "The Misunderstood Role of Small Business," Business Economics, Vol. 29, No. 3 (July 1994), pp. 1-6.
122. Wilson, Bureaucracy.
123. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Public Law 108-458, 108th Cong., 2d sess., December 17, 2004.
124. Wilson, Bureaucracy;
125. and Joel Aberbach and Bert Rockman, In the Web of Politics: Three Decades of the U.S. Federal Executive (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 2000).
126. Hannan and Freeman, "Structural Inertia and Organizational Change."
127. Barbara Levitt and James G. March, "Organizational Learning," Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 14 (1988), pp. 322-323.
128. Hannan and Freeman, "Structural Inertia and Organizational Change," pp. 149-164.
129. Major works arguing that administrative agencies become more durable as they get older include Downs, Inside Bureaucracy;
130. Kaufman, Are Government Organizations Immortal?;
131. and Lowi, The End of Liberalism.
132. A great deal of work suggests that government agencies are like firms and other organizations in this regard. See Stinchcombe, "Social Structures and Organizations."
133. Herbert Simon, "Public Administration in Today's World of Organizations and Markets," John Gaus lecture, annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., September 1, 2000,
134. reprinted in PS: Political Science and Politics, Vol. 33, No. 4 (December 2000), pp. 752-754;
135. and Charles Perrow, Normal Accidents: Living with High-Risk Technologies (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999).
136. Terry M. Moe, "The Politicized Presidency," in John E. Chubb and Paul E. Peterson, eds., The New Direction in American Politics (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1985).
137. For a historical overview of intelligence reform efforts, see Richard A. Best Jr., Proposals for Intelligence Reorganization, 1949-2004 (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2004).
138. David Mayhew, Congress: The Electoral Connection (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1974).
139. Amy Zegart, Flawed by Design: The Evolution of the CIA, JCS, and NSC (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1999).
140. Terry M. Moe, "The Politics of Bureaucratic Structure," in John E. Chubb and Paul E. Peterson, eds., Can the Government Govern? (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1989), p. 326.
141. Zegart, Flawed by Design.
142. I b i d.
143. Interview, Los Angeles, California, October 18, 2004.
144. Council on Foreign Relations Independent Task Force, Making Intelligence Smarter, p. 25.
145. The two exceptions were the Webster and Bremer commissions.
146. National Performance Review, "The Intelligence Community."
147. House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, IC21, "Overview and Summary," p. 26.
148. U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century, Road Map for National Security, p. 82.
149. These were the Webster and Deutch commissions.
150. The Bremer and Gilmore commissions recommended abolishing the guidelines. The Council on Foreign Relations task force and the Hart-Rudman commission urged the CIA to review the guidelines and make recruiting clandestine assets one of the intelligence community's top priori
151. ties. For effects of the "scrub order," see Seymour M. Hersh, "Annals of National Security: What Went Wrong," New Yorker, December 18, 2001, p. 40.
152. The National Performance Review, "The Intelligence Community."
153. In a 2004 report, the House Intelligence Committee revealed that it had repeatedly criticized the CIA's human intelligence efforts and recommended corrective action in classified annexes to its annual authorization bills years before September 11. The committee noted, "After years of trying to convince, suggest, urge, entice, cajole, and pressure CIA to make wide-reaching changes in the way it conducts its HUMINT [human intelligence] mission ... CIA, in the committee's view, continues down a road leading over a proverbial cliff." House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Intelligence Authorization Act for FY 2005, H. Report 108-558, 108th Cong., 2d sess., June 21, 2004, p. 24.
154. National Institute for Public Policy, Modernizing Intelligence, pp. 85-98.
155. House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, IC21, "Intelligence Community Management," p. 21.
156. The Hart-Rudman commission had a broader focus, advocating a massive new educational initiative to improve the scientific and mathematics base for future national security needs.
157. Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the United States Intelligence Community, Preparing for the 21st Century, pp. 2-7.
158. The two exceptions were the Gilmore and Hart-Rudman commissions.
159. Joint Inquiry Final Report, p. 43.
160. The 9/11 Commission, "The Performance of the Intelligence Community," staff statement No. 11, April 14, 2004, p. 12.
161. The 9/11 Commission Report, p. 357;
162. and Joint Inquiry Final Report, pp. 236-237.
163. Joint Inquiry Final Report, p. 49.
164. The 9/11 Commission, "The Performance of the Intelligence Community," p. 9.
165. Joint Inquiry Final Report, p. 49.
166. The 9/11 Commission Report, p. 90.
167. Joint Inquiry Final Report, p. 265.
168. Hersh, "Annals of National Security."
169. Telephone interview with senior intelligence official, June 15, 2004.
170. "Intelligence Gaps: America's Spy Network Needs a Quick Fix," editorial, San Diego Union Tribune, April 22, 2002, p. B6.
171. Powers, "The Trouble with the CIA."
172. Joint Inquiry Final Report, p. xvi.
173. Telephone interview with senior intelligence official, January 30, 2004.
174. Spencer Ackerman and John B. Judis, "The Operator," New Republic Online, September 22, 2003, http://www.tnr.com.
175. Congress and the Nation, Vol. 9 (1993-1996): A Review of Government and Politics (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1998), pp. 242-246.
176. Robert Baer, See No Evil: The True Story of a Ground Soldier in the CIA's War on Terrorism (New York: Crown, 2002);
177. and Powers, "The Trouble with the CIA."
178. Mike DeWine, "Additional Comments," Joint Inquiry Final Report, p. 11.
179. See, for example, Robert David Steele, The New Craft of Intelligence: Personal, Public, and Political (Oakton, Va.: OSS International Press, 2002).
180. John Cannon, a senior intelligence official who moved to the private sector after September 11, said that he had fired more people in eight months in the private sector than during his entire career in the intelligence community. "Special Report: Time for a Rethink-America's Intelligence Services," Economist, April 20, 2002, pp. 23-25.
181. Telephone interview with senior intelligence official, February 5, 2004.
182. Walter Pincus, "Rumsfeld Casts Doubt On Intelligence Reform; Changes Suggested by Presidential Panel," Washington Post, April 9, 2002, p. A17;
183. and Spencer Ackerman, "Small Change," New Republic, December 13, 2004, p. 12.
184. The Homeland Security Act of 2002, Public Law 107-296, 107th Cong., 2d sess., November 25, 2002.
185. Richard A. Falkenrath, "The 9/11 Commission Report: A Review Essay," International Security, Vol. 29, No. 3 (Winter 2004/05), p. 172.
186. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S. Intelligence Community's Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq, 108th Cong., 2d sess., July 9, 2004.
187. Analysis from LexisNexis using the search terms "9/11 Commission" and "Iraq War" between July 22, 2004, and December 10, 2004.
188. Quoted in Eric Lichtblau and Charles Piller, "Without a Clue: How the FBI Lost Its Way," Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, August 11, 2002, p. 01J.
189. Richard B. Schmitt and Charles Piller, "FBI Draws Heat Over Pricey Software Trouble," Los Angeles Times, January 14, 2005, p. A12;
190. and Glenn A. Fine, "The Federal Bureau of Investigation's Trilogy Technology Modernization Project," testimony before the Senate Committee on Appropriations Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State, and the Judiciary, 109th Cong., 1st sess., February 3, 2005, http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/testimony/ 0502/final.pdf.
191. The 9/11 Commission Report, p. 265.
192. Ibid., p. 409.
193. Richard K. Betts, "Fixing Intelligence," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 81, No. 1 (January/February 2002), p. 44.