Proxy contests and corporate change: Implications for shareholder wealth

Journal of Financial Economics

Volumn 47, Issue 3, 1998, Pages 279-313

  Mulherin, J Harold ^a   Poulsen, Annette B ^b  

^a PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Corporate restructuring; G34; Management Turnover; Market for corporate control; Proxy contests

Indexed keywords

EID: 0040095489     PISSN: 0304405X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0304-405X(97)00046-9     Document Type: Article

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