The limits of transparency

Economic Notes

Volumn 38, Issue 1-2, 2009, Pages 1-37

  Cukierman, Alex ^a  

^a TEL AVIV UNIVERSITY   (Israel)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

CENTRAL BANK; ECONOMIC IMPACT; FEASIBILITY STUDY; FINANCIAL SYSTEM; FORECASTING METHOD; INFLATION; INTEREST RATE; MODEL; MONETARY POLICY; POLICY ANALYSIS; POLICY APPROACH; POLICY MAKING; THEORETICAL STUDY; TRADE-OFF;

EID: 70350047289     PISSN: 03915026     EISSN: 14680300     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0300.2009.00208.x     Document Type: Article

References (71)

1. Angelotos G M, Pavan A. Transparency of Information and Coordination in Economies with Investment Complementarities. American Economic Association Papers and Proceedings 2004, 94(2):91-8. pp
2. Artis M, Marcellino M, Proietti T. Dating the European Business Cycle. 2003, CEPR DP No. 3696, January
3. Ball L, Sheridan N, Bernanke B, Woodford M. Does Inflation Targeting Matter. The Inflation-Targeting Debate 2004, in, eds, Chicago and London, The University of Chicago Press
4. Barro R J, Gordon R. A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural Rate Model. Journal of Political Economy 1983, 91:589-610. pp
5. Bean C. Monetary Policy in an Uncertain World. 2005, Speech at Oxonia Distinguished Speakers Seminar, The Oxford Institute of Economic Policy, Oxford, February 22
6. Benigno P, Woodford M. Inflation Stabilization and Welfare: The Case of a Distorted Steady State. Journal of the European Economic Association 2005, 3(6):1185-236. pp
7. Bernanke B, Mishkin F. Inflation Targeting: A New Framework for Monetary Policy. Journal of Economic Perspectives 1997, 11:97-116. pp
8. Bernanke B, Laubach T, Mishkin F, Posen A. Inflation Targeting: Lessons from the International Experience 1999, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press
9. Blinder A S. Central Banking in Theory and Practice 1998, Cambridge, MA, The MIT Press
10. Budd A. Economic Policy, With and Without Forecasts. Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin 1998, 38(4):379-84. pp
11. Buiter W. Alice in Euroland. Journal of Common Market Studies 1999, 37(2):181-209. pp
12. Calvo G. Staggered Prices in a Utility-Maximizing Framework. Journal of Monetary Economics 1983, 12(3):383-98. pp
13. Clarida R, Gali J, Gertler M. The Science of Monetary Policy: A New Keynesian Perspective. Journal of Economic Literature 1999, 37:1661-707. pp
14. Cukierman A. Establishing a Reputation for Dependability by Means of Inflation Targets. Economics of Governance 2000, 1:53-76. http://www.tau.ac.il/~alexcuk/pdf/section11.pdf, pp, February. Reprinted in L. Mahadeva and G. Sterne (eds), , Routledge, 2000, Available on the web at
15. Cukierman A, Wyplosz C. Accountability, Credibility, Transparency and Stabilization Policy in the Eurosystem. The Impact of EMU on Europe and the Developing Countries 2001, 40-75. http://www.tau.ac.il/~alexcuk/pdf/a.pdf, in, ed, Oxford University Press, pp, Available on the web at
16. Cukierman A. Non-linearities in Taylor Rules - Causes Consequences and Evidence. 2004, http://www.tau.ac.il/~alexcuk/pdf/non-linear-taylor-rules-rev.pdf, August 2004, Available on the web at
17. Cukierman A. Keynesian Economics, Monetary Policy and the Business Cycle - New and Old. CESifo Economic Studies 2005, 51:4. http://www.tau.ac.il/~alexcuk/pdf/keynesian-econ-new-old-7.pdf, pp, Available on the web at
18. Cukierman A. Central Bank Independence and Monetary Policymaking Institutions - Past Present and Future. European Journal of Political Economy 2008, 24:722-36. http://www.tau.ac.il/~alexcuk/pdf/Published%20Version-POLECO1087.pdf, pp, Available on the net at
19. Cukierman A, Gerlach S. The Inflation Bias Revisited: Theory and Some International Evidence. The Manchester School 2003, 71(5):541-65. pp
20. Cukierman A, Lippi F. Endogenous Monetary Policy with Unobserved Potential Output. Journal of Economics Dynamics and Control 2005, 29(11):1951-83. http://www.tau.ac.il/~alexcuk/pdf/Lippi-III-2-05-JEDC-final.pdf, pp, Available on the web at
21. Cukierman A, Muscatelli A. Nonlinear Taylor Rules and Asymmetric Preferences in Central Banking: Evidence from the United Kingdom and the United States. The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics 2008, Vol. 8(Iss. 1). http://www.bepress.com/bejm/vol8/iss1/art7/, (Contributions), Article 7. Available on the net at
22. Diamond D, Dybvig P. Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity. Journal of Political Economy 1983, 91(3):401-19. pp
23. Ehrmann M, Fratzscher M. Social Value of Public Information - Testing the Limits to Transparency. 2007, Manuscript, ECB
24. Ehrmann M, Smets F. Uncertain Potential Output: Implications for Monetary Policy. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 2003, 27:1611-38. pp
25. Faust J, Svensson L. Transparency and Credibility: Monetary Policy with Unobservable Goals. International Economic Review 2001, 42:369-97. pp
26. Faust J, Henderson D. Is Inflation Targeting Best Practice Monetary Policy. Federal Reserve Bank of St-Louis Review 2004, 86(4):117-43. pp
27. Ferguson R. Monetary Credibility, Inflation and Economic Growth. 2005, http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2005/20051103/default.htm, November, Available on the web at
28. Friedman B, Mizen P. The Use and Meaning of Words in Central Banking: Inflation Targeting, Credibility and Transparency. Central Banking, Monetary Theory and Practice 2003, in, ed, Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, USA, Edward Elgar
29. Geraats P. The Mystique of Central Bank Speak. International Journal of Central Banking 2007a, 3(1):37-80. pp
30. Geraats P. Political Pressures and Monetary Mystique. 2007b, Manuscript, University of Cambridge, May
31. Gersbach H. On the Negative Social Value of Central Bank's Knowledge Transparency. Economics of Governance 2003, 4(2):91-102. pp
32. Gersbach H, Hahn V. Voting Transparency in a Monetary Union. 2005, CEPR Discussion Paper No. 5155
33. Gersbach H, Hahn V. Monetary Policy Inclinations. 2007, Manuscript, Center for Economic Research at ETH, Zurich
34. Goldstein I, Pauzner A. Demand Deposit Contracts and the Probability of Bank Runs. Journal of Finance 2005, 60(3):1293-327. pp
35. Goodfriend M. Monetary Mystique: Secrecy and Central Banking. Journal of Monetary Economics 1986, 17(1):30-7. pp
36. Goodfriend M, King R. The New Neoclassical Synthesis and the Role of Monetary Policy. NBER Macroeconomic Annual 1997, 231-82. Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, pp
37. Gosselin P, Lotz A, Wyplosz C. When Central Banks Reveal Future Interest Rates: Alignement of Expectations Vs Creative Opacity. 2007, Manuscript, Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva
38. Greenspan A. Chairman's Remarks. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review 2002, 84(4). July - August
39. Greenspan A. Risk and Uncertainty in Monetary Policy. 2004, 94:33-40. pp
40. Issing O. The Eurosystem: Transparent and Accountable or 'Willem in Euroland'. Journal of Common Market Studies 1999, 37(3):503-19. pp
41. Issing O. Communications, Transparency, Accountability - Monetary Policy in the Twenty-First Century. 2004, Revised English version of the " Thunen Lecture" delivered at the Annual Congress of the " Verein fur Socialpolitik" in Dresden
42. Jensen H. Optimal Degree of Transparency in Monetary Policymaking. Scandinavian Journal of Economics 2002, 104(3):399-422. pp
43. King M. Challenges for Monetary Policy: New and Old. New Challenges for Monetary Policy 1999, 11-57. in, Kansas City, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, pp
44. Kuttner K. Estimating Potential Output as a Latent Variable. Journal of Business & Economic Statistics 1994, 12(3):361-8. pp
45. Kuttner K, Kent C, Guttman S. A Snapshot of Inflation Targeting in its Adolescence. The Future of Inflation Targeting 2004, 6-42. in, eds, Sydney, Reserve Bank of Australia, pp
46. Kydland F E, Prescott E C. Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans. Journal of Political Economy 1977, 85:473-92. pp
47. Lohmann S. Optimal Commitment in Monetary Policy: Credibility versus Flexibility. American Economic Review 1992, 82(1):273-86. pp
48. Mishkin F, Kent C, Guttman S. Can Central Bank Transparency Go Too Far. The Future of Inflation Targeting 2004, 48-65. in, eds, Sydney, Reserve Bank of Australia, pp
49. Morris S, Shin H. Social Value of Public Information. American Economic Review 2002, 92(5):1521-34. pp
50. Morris S, Shin H, Dewatripont M, Hansen L, Turnovsky S. Global Games: Theory and Applications. Advances in Economics and Econometrics, the Eighth World Congress 2003, 56-114. in, eds, Cambridge, MA, Cambridge University Press, pp
51. Morris S, Shin H. Central Bank Transparency and the Signal Value of Prices. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 2005, 2:1-66. pp
52. Morris S, Shin H S, Tong H. Reply to 'Social Value of Public Information: Morris and Shin (2002) is Actually Pro Transparency Not Con'. American Economic Review 2006, 96(1):453-55. pp
53. Orphanides A. Monetary Policy Rules Based on Real-Time Data. American Economic Review 2001, 91(4):964-85. pp
54. Orphanides A. Monetary Policy Evaluation with Noisy Information. Journal of Monetary Economics 2003, 50(3):605-31. pp
55. Orphanides A, Williams J. The Decline of Activist Stabilization Policy: Natural Rate Misperceptions, Learning, and Expectations (2005). Journal of Economics Dynamics and Control 2005, 29(11):1927-50. pp
56. Rogoff K. The Optimal Degree of Commitment to a Monetary Target. Quarterly Journal of Economics 1985, 100:1169-90. pp
57. Romer C, Romer D. Federal Reserve Information and the Behavior of Interest Rates. The American Economic Review 2000, 90(3):429-57. pp
58. Rotemberg J, Woodford M, Bernanke B, Rotemberg J. An Optimization Based Econometric Framework for the Evaluation of Monetary Policy. NBER Macroeconomic Annual 1997, 297-346. in, eds, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, pp
59. Rudebusch G. Assessing Nominal Income Rules for Monetary Policy with Model and Data Uncertainty. The Economic Journal 2002, 112:402-32. pp
60. Ruge-Murcia F J. Does the Barro-Gordon Model Explain the Behavior of US Inflation? A Reexamination of the Empirical Evidence. Journal of Monetary Economics 2003, 50:1375-90. pp
61. Sibert A. Monetary Policy Committees: individual and Collective Reputations. Review of Economic Studies 2003, 70:649-65. pp
62. Sims C. Implications of Rational Inattention. 2002, http://sims.princeton.edu/yftp/Gerzensee/info.pdf, Manuscript, Princeton University, Available on the web at
63. Svensson L. Monetary Policy and Real Stabilization. New Challenges for Monetary Policy 2002, 261-312. in, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, pp
64. Svensson L, Mizen P. The Inflation Forecast and the Loss Function. Central Banking, Monetary Theory and Practice 2003a, 135-52. in, ed, Essays in Honour of Charles Goodhart, Cheltenham, UK and Northhampton, MA, Edward Elgar, pp
65. Svensson L. What is Wrong with Taylor Rules? Using Judgement in Monetary Policy through Targeting Rules. Journal of Economic Literature 2003b, 61:426-77. pp
66. Svensson L, Woodford Michael. Indicator Variables for Optimal Policy. Journal of Monetary Economics 2003, 50:691-720. pp
67. Svensson L. Social Value of Public Information: Morris and Shin (2002) Is Actually Pro Transparency, Not Con. American Economic Review 2006, 96(1):448-51. pp
68. Van Der Cruijsen C, Eijffinger S, Bohl M, Siklos P, Wohar M. The Economic Impact of Central Bank Transparency: A Survey. Challenges in Central Banking: The Present Institutional Environment and the Forces Affecting the Conduct of Monetary Policy forthcoming, in, eds, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press
69. Vickers J. Inflation Targeting in Practice: The UK Experience. Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin 1998, 38(4):368-75. pp
70. Winkler B. Which Kind of Transparency? On the Need for Clarity in Monetary Policy-Making. 2000, WP No. 26, ECB, August
71. Woodford M. Interest and Prices: Foundations of a Theory of Monetary Policy 2003, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press