On the efficiency of sequential auctions for spectrum sharing

Proceedings of the 2009 International Conference on Game Theory for Networks, GameNets '09

Volumn , Issue , 2009, Pages 199-205

  Bae, Junjik ^a   Beigman, Eyal ^b   Berry, Randall ^c   Honig, Michael L ^c   Vohra, Rakesh ^d  

^a BOSTON CONSULTING GROUP   (United States)

^b WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY IN ST LOUIS   (United States)

^c Northwestern University   (United States)

^d NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

DOMINANCE PROPERTIES; DOMINANT STRATEGY; INDIVISIBLE GOOD; MARGINALS; RESOURCE UNITS; SECOND-PRICE AUCTION; SEQUENTIAL AUCTIONS; SPECTRUM SHARING; WIRELESS RESOURCES; WORST-CASE EFFICIENCY;

COMMERCE; RESOURCE VALUATION; WIRELESS NETWORKS;

GAME THEORY;

EID: 70350000221     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1109/GAMENETS.2009.5137402     Document Type: Conference Paper

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