A Learning Approach to Auctions

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 82, Issue 1, 1998, Pages 65-88

  Hon Snir, Shlomit ^a   Monderer, Dov ^a   Sela, Aner ^b  

^a TECHNION ISRAEL INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (Israel)

^b UNIVERSITY OF MANNHEIM   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0002057229     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.1998.2419     Document Type: Article

References (33)

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