Disagreement and learning in a dynamic contracting model

Review of Financial Studies

Volumn 22, Issue 10, 2009, Pages 3873-3906

  Adrian, Tobias ^a   Westerfield, Mark M ^b  

^a FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 70349439171     PISSN: 08939454     EISSN: 14657368     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhn115     Document Type: Article

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