Optimal compensation with adverse selection and dynamic actions

Mathematics and Financial Economics

Volumn 1, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 21-55

  Cvitanić, Jakša ^a   Zhang, Jianfeng ^b  

^a CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Adverse selection; Continuous time models; Contracts; Managers compensation; Moral hazard; Principal agent problems

Indexed keywords

EID: 49749140774     PISSN: 18629679     EISSN: 18629660     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11579-007-0002-2     Document Type: Article

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