An experimental investigation of soft price caps in uniform price auction markets for wholesale electricity

Journal of Regulatory Economics

Volumn 36, Issue 1, 2009, Pages 44-59

  Vossler, Christian A ^a   Mount, Timothy D ^b   Thomas, Robert J ^c   Zimmerman, Ray D ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TENNESSEE   (United States)

^b Department of Obstetrics Gynecology   (United States)

^c Cornell University   (United States)

Author keywords

Electricity markets; Experimental auctions; Soft cap auction; Uniform price auction

Indexed keywords

EID: 70349328341     PISSN: 0922680X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11149-009-9090-7     Document Type: Article

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