Competition with forward contracts: A laboratory analysis motivated by electricity market design

Economic Journal

Volumn 118, Issue 525, 2008, Pages 192-214

  Brandts, Jordi ^a   Pezanis Christou, Paul ^b   Schram, Arthur ^c  

^a Barcelona)

^b UniversitéLouis Pasteur ^*  (Netherlands)

^c UNIVERSITY OF AMSTERDAM   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COMPETITION (ECONOMICS); COMPETITIVENESS; ECONOMIC THEORY; EFFICIENCY MEASUREMENT; EXPERIMENTAL STUDY; MARKET DEVELOPMENT; THEORETICAL STUDY;

EID: 37749033159     PISSN: 00130133     EISSN: 14680297     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2007.02109.x     Document Type: Article

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