Hobbesian hierarchy: The political economy of political organization

Annual Review of Political Science

Volumn 12, Issue , 2009, Pages 263-283

  Lake, David A ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Authority; Capitalism; Empire; Political parties; Specific assets; State; Transaction costs

Indexed keywords

EID: 69049089100     PISSN: 10942939     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1146/annurev.polisci.12.041707.193640     Document Type: Article

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