Economic integration and global governance: Why so little supranationalism?

The Politics of Global Regulation

Volumn , Issue , 2009, Pages 242-275

  Kahler, Miles ^a   Lake, D A ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84884795108     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: None     Document Type: Chapter

References (81)

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71. Networked governance is similar to but distinct from models of diffusion
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79. Helleiner, "The Politics of Global Financial Regulation," makes this comparison.
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