Better safe than sorry: Precautionary reasoning and implied dominance in risky decisions

Journal of Behavioral Decision Making

Volumn 22, Issue 3, 2009, Pages 338-361

  Dekay, Michael L ^a   Patiño Echeverri, Dalia ^b   Fischbeck, Paul S ^c,d  

^a OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b DUKE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^d CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Consequentialism; Deontology; Dominance; Information distortion; Outcome evaluation; Path utility; Precautionary principle; Risk; Threshold

Indexed keywords

EID: 68649111842     PISSN: 08943257     EISSN: 10990771     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1002/bdm.630     Document Type: Article

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