Democracy-Enhancing Multilateralism

International Organization

Volumn 63, Issue 1, 2009, Pages 1-31

  Keohane, Robert O ^a   MacEdo, Stephen ^a   Moravcsik, Andrew ^a  

^a PRINCETON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 68349142949     PISSN: 00208183     EISSN: 15315088     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0020818309090018     Document Type: Article

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