Improved equilibria via public service advertising

Proceedings of the Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms

Volumn , Issue , 2009, Pages 728-737

  Balcan, Maria Florina ^a   Blum, Avrim ^a   Mansour, Yishay ^b  

^a Carnegie Mellon University   (United States)

^b TEL AVIV UNIVERSITY   (Israel)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COST EFFECTIVENESS; MARKETING; PUBLIC RELATIONS; SCHEDULING;

ADVERTISING CAMPAIGN; NASH EQUILIBRIA; PARTY AFFILIATION GAMES; PRICE OF ANARCHY; PRICE OF STABILITY; PUBLIC SERVICES; UNRELATED MACHINES; VIRAL MARKETING;

COSTS;

EID: 67651208193     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1137/1.9781611973068.80     Document Type: Conference Paper

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