Gift giving and the evolution of cooperation

International Economic Review

Volumn 38, Issue 3, 1997, Pages 485-509

  Carmichael, H Lorne ^a   Macleod, W Bentley ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

GIFT EXCHANGE; THEORY; TRADE RELATIONS;

EID: 0031430916     PISSN: 00206598     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2527277     Document Type: Article

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