How does outsourcing affect performance dynamics? Evidence from the automobile industry

Management Science

Volumn 54, Issue 12, 2008, Pages 1963-1979

  Novak, Sharon ^a   Stern, Scott ^b  

^a MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

^b NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Automobile industry; Contracting costs; Knowledge based view of the firm; Performance dynamics; Vertical integration

Indexed keywords

AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY; CONTRACTING COSTS; KNOWLEDGE-BASED VIEW OF THE FIRM; PERFORMANCE DYNAMICS; VERTICAL INTEGRATION;

DYNAMICS; INTEGRATION; KNOWLEDGE BASED SYSTEMS; OUTSOURCING; PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT; PROJECT MANAGEMENT; QUALITY FUNCTION DEPLOYMENT;

LIFE CYCLE;

EID: 61849169625     PISSN: 00251909     EISSN: 15265501     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.1080.0922     Document Type: Article

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