Does institutional activism increase shareholder wealth? Evidence from spillovers on non-target companies

Journal of Corporate Finance

Volumn 15, Issue 4, 2009, Pages 488-504

  Lee, Dong Wook ^a   Park, Kyung Suh ^a  

^a Korea University   (South Korea)

Author keywords

Institutional activism; Korea corporate governance fund; Shareholder wealth; Spillovers

Indexed keywords

EID: 67649488313     PISSN: 09291199     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2009.03.002     Document Type: Article

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