Characterization of social choice sets in terms of individuals' maximal sets: The fixed agenda framework

Social Choice and Welfare

Volumn 18, Issue 1, 2001, Pages 113-127

  Peris, Josep E ^a   Sánchez, M Carmen ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ALICANTE   (Spain)

^b UNIVERSITY OF MURCIA   (Spain)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0035581792     PISSN: 01761714     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s003550000063     Document Type: Article

References (11)

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