메뉴 건너뛰기




Volumn 40, Issue 2, 2009, Pages 301-332

The inefficiency of price quantity bargaining

Author keywords

Bargaining; Inefficiencies; Strategic discrimination; Substitutability

Indexed keywords


EID: 67349144399     PISSN: 09382259     EISSN: 14320479     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00199-008-0375-3     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (4)

References (17)
  • 1
    • 33746972585 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Sequencing strategically: Wage negotiations under oligopoly
    • A. Banerji 2002 Sequencing strategically: wage negotiations under oligopoly Int J Indust Org 20 1037 1058
    • (2002) Int J Indust Org , vol.20 , pp. 1037-1058
    • Banerji, A.1
  • 2
    • 0000257565 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • The incentive for working hard: Explaining hours worked differences in the US and Germany
    • DOI 10.1016/S0927-5371(01)00030-6, PII S0927537101000306
    • L.A. Bell R.B. Freeman 2001 The incentive for working hard: explaining hours worked differences in the US and Germany Labour Econ 8 181 202 (Pubitemid 33640126)
    • (2001) Labour Economics , vol.8 , Issue.2 , pp. 181-202
    • Bell, L.A.1    Freeman, R.B.2
  • 3
    • 0003193070 scopus 로고
    • Perfect equilibrium in bargaining models
    • Basil Blackwell Oxford
    • Binmore K.: Perfect equilibrium in bargaining models. In: Binmore, K., Dasgupta, P.(eds) The Economics of Bargaining, pp. 77-105. Basil Blackwell, Oxford (1987)
    • (1987) The Economics of Bargaining , pp. 77-105
    • Binmore, K.1    Binmore, K.2    Dasgupta, P.3
  • 4
    • 67349254835 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Stationary equilibria in bargaining with externalities
    • forthcoming
    • Björnerstedt, J., Westermark, A.: Stationary equilibria in bargaining with externalities. Games Econ Behav (2008) (forthcoming)
    • (2008) Games Econ Behav
    • Björnerstedt, J.1
  • 5
    • 67349191191 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Department of Economics, Uppsala University
    • Björnerstedt, J., Westermark, A.: Proof of Proposition 7. Department of Economics, Uppsala University. http://www.nek.uu.se/Faculty/Westermark/ proposition7.5.nb (2006b)
    • Proof of Proposition 7
    • Björnerstedt, J.1
  • 6
    • 67349216939 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Department of Economics, Uppsala University Working paper 2006:6
    • Björnerstedt, J., Westermark, A.: Bargaining and Strategic Discrimination. Department of Economics, Uppsala University Working paper 2006:6 (2006c)
    • (2006) Bargaining and Strategic Discrimination
    • Björnerstedt, J.1
  • 7
    • 34848900478 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Bilateral oligopoly - The efficiency of intermediate goods markets
    • DOI 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2007.06.001, PII S016771870700077X
    • J. Björnerstedt J. Stennek 2007 Bilateral oligopoly-the efficiency of intermediate goods markets Int J Indust Org 25 884 907 (Pubitemid 47503369)
    • (2007) International Journal of Industrial Organization , vol.25 , Issue.5 , pp. 884-907
    • Bjornerstedt, J.1    Stennek, J.2
  • 8
    • 84936526674 scopus 로고
    • Worker substitutability and patterns of unionisation
    • H. Horn A. Wolinsky 1988 Worker substitutability and patterns of unionisation Econ J 98 484 497
    • (1988) Econ J , vol.98 , pp. 484-497
    • Horn, H.1    Wolinsky, A.2
  • 9
    • 0011602778 scopus 로고
    • Cyclical delay in bargaining with externalities
    • P. Jehiel B. Moldovanu 1995 Cyclical delay in bargaining with externalities Rev Econ Stud 62 619 637
    • (1995) Rev Econ Stud , vol.62 , pp. 619-637
    • Jehiel, P.1    Moldovanu, B.2
  • 10
    • 0029207027 scopus 로고
    • Negative externalities may cause delay in negotiation
    • P. Jehiel B. Moldovanu 1995 Negative externalities may cause delay in negotiation Econometrica 63 1321 1335
    • (1995) Econometrica , vol.63 , pp. 1321-1335
    • Jehiel, P.1    Moldovanu, B.2
  • 11
    • 0003019549 scopus 로고
    • Perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model
    • A. Rubinstein 1982 Perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model Econometrica 50 97 110
    • (1982) Econometrica , vol.50 , pp. 97-110
    • Rubinstein, A.1
  • 12
    • 0040003931 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Contracting with externalities
    • I. Segal 1999 Contracting with externalities Q J Econ 114 337 388
    • (1999) Q J Econ , vol.114 , pp. 337-388
    • Segal, I.1
  • 13
    • 0347578233 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Coordination and discrimination in contracting with externalities: Divide and conquer?
    • DOI 10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00114-5
    • I. Segal 2003 Coordination and discrimination in contracting with externalities: divide and conquer? J Econ Theor 113 147 181 (Pubitemid 37551070)
    • (2003) Journal of Economic Theory , vol.113 , Issue.2 , pp. 147-181
    • Segal, I.1
  • 14
    • 0038617759 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Robust predictions for bilateral contracting with externalities
    • I. Segal M.D. Whinston 2003 Robust predictions for bilateral contracting with externalities Econometrica 71 757 791
    • (2003) Econometrica , vol.71 , pp. 757-791
    • Segal, I.1    Whinston, M.D.2
  • 15
    • 0000805593 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Intra-firm Bargaining under Non-binding Contracts
    • L.A. Stole J. Zweibel 1996 Intra-firm bargaining under non-binding contracts Rev Econ Stud 63 375 410 (Pubitemid 126458751)
    • (1996) Review of Economic Studies , vol.63 , Issue.3 , pp. 375-410
    • Stole, L.A.1    Zwiebel, J.2
  • 16
    • 0029822255 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Organizational design and technology choice under intrafirm bargaining
    • L.A. Stole J. Zweibel 1996 Organizational design and technology choice under intrafirm bargaining Am Econ Rev 86 195 222
    • (1996) Am Econ Rev , vol.86 , pp. 195-222
    • Stole, L.A.1    Zweibel, J.2
  • 17
    • 0037716308 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Bargaining, binding contracts, and competitive wages
    • DOI 10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00007-1
    • A. Westermark 2003 Bargaining, binding contracts and competitive wages Games Econ Behav 43 296 311 (Pubitemid 36645519)
    • (2003) Games and Economic Behavior , vol.43 , Issue.2 , pp. 296-311
    • Westermark, A.1


* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.