Sequencing strategically: Wage negotiations under oligopoly

International Journal of Industrial Organization

Volumn 20, Issue 7, 2002, Pages 1037-1058

  Banerji, A ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF DELHI   (India)

Author keywords

Bargaining; Oligopoly; Sequencing; Wage determination

Indexed keywords

EID: 33746972585     PISSN: 01677187     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/s0167-7187(01)00056-x     Document Type: Article

References (15)

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